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**Threat Theory:
A Model for Forecasting the Threat Environment
of the Future**

**A Monograph
by
Lieutenant Colonel Larry D. Bruns
Military Intelligence**

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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OMB No. 0704-0188

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|---|---|--|---|---|--|
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | | 2. REPORT DATE 14/05/93 | | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THREAT THEORY: A MODEL FOR FORECASTING THREAT ENVIRONMENT OF THE FUTURE | | | | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) LTC LARRY D. BRUNS, USA | | | | | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES ATTN: ATZL-SWV FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900 COM (913) 684-3437 AUTOVON 552-3437 | | | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | | | | 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER | |
| 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | | | | | |
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED | | | | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE | |
| 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) SEE ATTACHED SHEET | | | | | |
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS THREAT FORECASTING GRAND STRATEGY FORCE DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGN PLANNING MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE | | | | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 64 | |
| | | | | 16. PRICE CODE | |
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED | | |

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE

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Title of Monograph: Threat Theory: A Model for Forecasting the Threat Environment of the Future.

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Accepted this 14th day of May 1993.

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| Accession For | |
| NTIS | CR&I |
| DTIC | T&E |
| Unannounced | |
| Justification | |
| By | |
| Distribution/ | |
| Availability Codes | |
| Dist | Avail and/or Special |
| A-1 | |

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ABSTRACT

Threat Theory: A Model for Forecasting the Threat Environment in the Future
by Lieutenant Colonel Larry D. Bruns, USA, 64 pages.

A new environment, a new paradigm faces United States policy and decision makers. The bipolar world of superpower control and confrontation has been replaced with an unipolar world lead by the United States. A rapid evolution is occurring. A multipolar world is developing composed nation states and non-nation states competing against each other and the United States to promote and protect their vital interests. This new environment confronts this nation with a growing number of unknowns and difficult choices.

In such conditions, a logical assumption is that any nation state that can accurately forecast future trends, events, and likely threats will have a distinct advantage. The reality is that there are many pundits proposing a kaleidoscope of possible threats. There is no consistent methodology to identify those nation states and non-nation states that are and will evolve into threats. The lack of a viable forecast results in a fragile and ineffectual grand strategy. History is replete with examples of the penalties to nation states that fail to anticipate and correctly understand a new geopolitical environment.

This paper proposes a means to evaluate the environment and the threats it presents. That methodology provides a consistent review of the environment highlighting those nation states and non-nation states posing likely threats to the United States now and in the future. Armed with the forecast results, specific recommendations are made on the development of a grand strategy that places the United States in a favorable position to meet economic, diplomatic, and military threats.

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I. INTRODUCTION

November 9, 1989, February 28, 1991, and December, 25 1991 are more than just circled dates on an old personal calendar.¹ They represent global shifts in the existing diplomatic, economic, and military balance. The decades-old conditions acclimating nation states changed in a rapid succession of events symbolized by these dates. Consequently, the clear distinctions between ideologies and threats became vague. Today policy and decision makers face an uncertain global picture. New priorities and strategies are being developed in an ambiguous environment.

Thus contemporary events suggest a turning point in world history. The United States is on a threshold of a new and ambiguous environment clouding its ability to identify threats.² Preparation for this environment requires flexible, iterative planning supported by a means or methodology to anticipate threats. Making a prediction or forecast is hazardous. It becomes more hazardous when predictions or forecasts are unstructured opinions, illogical, or simply uninformed, intuitive speculation. Our old Soviet foes criticized our propensity for this type of forecasting. The United States should not take the criticism lightly.

One of the basic deficiencies of all variants of bourgeois systems theories... is that they cannot explain changes in social systems, whether inter-societal or international: they cannot point out a basic factor that motivates the changes and they cannot discover the mechanism of change.³

Recent United State's threat predictions and forecasts have been against monolithic threats. The last six decades defined a process focused on the Axis powers followed immediately by the Soviet Union. United State's intelligence efforts focused on detailing every aspect of a single threat. Response to unexpected changes and threats was institutional surprise followed by internecine finger pointing, but never a detailed analysis of the dynamics causing change.⁴ Predictions and forecasts were limited to what the Soviet's might do militarily. The yearly publication of the Secretary of Defense's "Soviet Military Power" and the Army's "Soviet Battlefield Development Plan" are representative of that mindset.⁵ This myopic focus drove forty-years of force structure and doctrine targeted against the Soviet threat. A new paradigm leaves the United States engaged in a multipolar world and facing a vague threat situation. The Soviet's assessment may be correct if the United States prepares for threats as in the past.

Anticipating threats and preparing for them is part of a sound grand strategy.⁶ This intellectual exercise must be accomplished without running the risk of being too institutionally conservative and too individually biased in the analysis. Supporting grand strategy preparation, in the current environment, requires structured analysis, expanded collection, and accurate

forecasts. This paper proposes a more accurate forecasting system; describes its elements and interactions; uses a historical case study testing its validity; and applies the system, forecasting future threats to the United States.

II. Terms and Variables

Survival Interest. The primary interest of any nation state, the *sine qua non* of its existence, is the protection of its citizens and their institutions against foreign enemies.⁷

Vital Interest. An interest is vital when the highest policy makers in a sovereign state conclude that the issue at stake is so fundamental to the political, economic, and social well being of their country that it should not be compromised - even if this conclusion results in the use of economic and military sanctions.⁸

Elements of National Power. Elements of national power are the tools by which nation states promote, project, and protect their vital interests. The elements of power are economic, diplomatic or political, and military.

Predictions. Is the art of judging the future state of an object, based on the subjective "weighing" of a large number of qualitative and quantitative factors.⁹

Forecasting. Is a research process, as a result of which we obtain probability data about the future state of the object being forecast.¹⁰

Forecasting system. Is a system which incorporates mathematical, logical, and heuristic elements. Its input is fed by up-to-the-minute information about the object being forecast and its output is a forecast about the future state of this object.¹¹

Potential threats. Nation states having any combination of basic orientation, hostile intent, capabilities, or catalytic events, the interaction, of which, will possibly place the vital interests of the United States at risk.

Likely threats. A refined subset of potential threats whose evaluated vital interests directly complete with and endanger those of the United States.

N = Current and future nation states.

N² = Non-nation states.

C = Nation states with economic, diplomatic and military capabilities.

I = Nation states with hostile intent.

B = Nation states with hostile basic orientation.

CT = Nation states with or facing catalyst events.

P = Potential threats.

T = Likely threats.

III. Filter Process

The proposed forecasting system structures a thought process that incorporates mathematics, logic, and heuristic elements. It uses two major components: a filter process and a vital interests matrix. The filter reduces the sum of nation states to a set of potential threats. The resulting list of potential threats is evaluated using a vital interests matrix.¹² The vital interests matrix compares the potential threat's vital interests with those of the United States. Conflicting, competitive, and diverging vital interests identify nation states that are likely threats and become the focus for planning grand and military strategies.

The filter uses four factors to confirm or eliminate potential threats. Those factors are: basic orientation, intent, capabilities, and catalysts. Before detailing each it is necessary to keep in mind the dynamics of the filter illustrated in Figure 1. There is continuous interaction among factors and change is the only constant. The filter captures the relationships among nation states. The filter is both a screen and pre-assessment mechanism. The screening function combines quantitative and qualitative analysis of factors as they apply to each nation state. The pre-assessment serves to focus analysis on those nation states who exhibit potential to be threats. Continuous collection and analysis feed the filter process providing a means to sense change within a nation state. To be of use it must be a continuous and dynamic process sensitive to these changes. Discussion of the filter begins with the factor of basic orientation.




Figure 1

Basic orientations are essentially emotions or feelings inciting a collective response. Karl von Clausewitz, an 18th Century General, military theorist, and author, understood the impact of basic orientation stating, "Two different motives make men fight one another: hostile feelings and

hostile intentions".¹³ A hostile feeling or basic orientation can be religious preference, negative historical experiences, social or cultural differences, hatred or jealousy resulting from competition, or be racially motivated. Basic orientations flare or simmer, but once surfaced they can immediately bond or bring down a nation state. These collective emotions of a nation state play a role in international affairs. The on-going war in the Balkans, ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union, and the religious street fighting in Northern Ireland are examples of tensions generated by basic orientations. They can cause a range of responses from an irrational act to calculated hostile intent.

The second aspect of the filter is Intent. Intent connotes planning to achieve an end state. Hostile intent is the will and the plan to harm another. A nation state having hostile intent has developed strategies to compete or threaten the vital interests of another nation state. Hostile intent may be derived from a basic orientation or emerge as vital interests are brought into conflict. John Spanier, author of Games Nations Play, captures the essence of this competition stating, "Each state, like any player in a competitive game, seeks to advance its own interests in conflict with those of other states".¹⁴ Von Clausewitz characterized hostile intent as "...the universal element of all wars".¹⁵ Nation states having hostile intent develop or evolve capabilities to protect and promote their vital interests at the expense of other nation states.

The third aspect of the filter is capability. There is a close relationship between intent and capabilities. Analysts traditionally use these two elements to determine if a nation state is a threat. Mature threats to a nation state will have an intent and a capability component. Capabilities are expressed as elements of national power whether, diplomatic, economic, or military. The interaction of these elements is expressed by the author Correlli Barnett:

the power of a nation state by no means consists only in its armed forces, but also in its economic and technological resources; in the dexterity, foresight, and resolution with which its foreign policy is conducted; in the efficiency of its social and political organizations.¹⁶

A nation state's power is measured in its capabilities. The relative capabilities among nation states represent the balance of power.¹⁷ When there is an imbalance the stronger can enforce its will. When the relative power between nation states is the same then competition for enhanced national power ensues. Furthermore, evaluating a nation state's capabilities is not simple. Nation states evolve and change. Forecasting a nation state's capabilities must consider its current state and the potential to enhance some element of national power. Periodic evaluations consider economic and trade potential and military, industrial, and technology bases.

The last aspect in the filter is the catalyst. In science a catalyst is a substance, usually found in small amounts, modifying a reaction without being consumed in the process.¹⁸ Catalysts defined in the filter process are factors in the internal and external relationships of nation states. Catalysts rapidly change the political paradigm between nation states. Political, economic, and

military catalysts share solidarity with their scientific cousins as their size and importance may go unnoticed until a reactions begins or is completed. This dialectic makes their impact difficult to anticipate and hard to forecast once the reaction begins. As more nation states accrue capabilities, catalysts increase the ambiguity of relationships and the need for a viable forecasting system. A recent example of a catalyst at work is the demise of the Soviet Union. It is a catalyst whose end state has not been achieved.

The filter factors were developed singularly, not addressing the dynamic of interaction suggested earlier and portrayed in Figure 1. It is this interplay that makes the filter an essential element of the forecasting system. The filter pre-assesses each nation state using each factor and then the combination of factors. This assessment reduces the sum of nation states (ΣN) to those nation states posing a potential threat (P). The filter process requires a level of knowledge about each nation state: its capabilities; cultural tendencies; social fabric; and historical relationships. An initial assessment of the factors requires a **yes** or **no** answer. For example does Nation State A have a hostile basic orientation directed toward Nation State B? Answers are aggregated in a potential threat matrix (see Figure 2). The matrix highlights nation states triggering a **yes** response to the factors in the filter. Each nation state with a positive response (**yes**) to a factor is reevaluated. Potential threats are developed when triggered factors allow a positive response to the question: can, given the interaction of factors, this nation state pose a threat to the vital interests of the United States? These potential threats received detailed evaluation through a comparison of vital interests and the vital interests matrix.

Potential Threats Matrix

| Nation State | Basic Orientation | Intent | Capabilities | Catalyst | Potential Threat |
|--------------|-------------------|------------|--------------|----------|------------------|
| One | No | No | No | No | No |
| Two | Yes | No | No | No | No |
| Three | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Four | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes |

Figure 2

IV. Vital Interests and the Vital Interests Matrix

Vital interests are considered fundamental to the political, economic, and social well being of nation states. Nation states regardless of size or capabilities take measures to protect and promote their vital interests. When these vital interests are challenged nation states use elements of national power to ensure their protection. The threat of economic, diplomatic, or military actions against a vital interest places nation states in confrontation and a potential threat becomes a likely threat. The scale of confrontation spans the spectrum from economic

competition to armed conflict. A nation state recognizes threats when capabilities and intent are being applied to its detriment. This perception sometimes occurs late with one nation state taking advantage of another. Nation states that continually forecast and monitor their status vis-a-vis others have a distinct advantage.

A vital interests matrix is a listing of each nation state's vital interests. Those of one nation state along the X-Axis and those of a potential threat on the Y-Axis (Figure 3). A comparison is made focusing on conflicting vital interests. Analysis emphasizes the logic and heuristic elements of the forecasting system. The standard used in the matrix will be **shared** vital interests, **neutral** impact on vital interests, or vital interests **in conflict**.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX
Y Axis

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------|--|---|---|---|---|
| X A x i s | Nation State X Nation State A | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| | 1 | | | | |
| | 2 | | | | |
| | 3 | | | | |
| | 4 | | | | |

Figure 3

Shared vital interests are used to establish an alliance or continue friendly relations. An example of shared vital interest is the need for open access to sea lines of communication. This vital interest is shared by most of the western nation states and has served as an underpinning of the NATO Alliance. A neutral vital interest has no impact or no comparison can be made. Conflicting vital interests set the stage for confrontation between nation states. Vital interests in conflict are incompatible and resolution will require the use of national elements of power. A stark example of conflicting vital interests is nation state desiring to control a vital choke points versus one needing open access to lines of communications.

To test the validity of the forecasting system a hypothetical nation state was used. The conditions, variables, and results are detailed in Annex A. The resulting forecast for Nation State A was measured against the following criteria: 1.) did the forecast identify potential threats to Nation State A; 2.) did the forecast consider the impact of events and catalysts on Nation State A's allies and potential threats; and 3.) did the forecast identify likely threats in sufficient time to allow Nation State A to prepare courses of action and strategies.

The forecasting system satisfied the criteria. It focused Nation State A efforts onto the most dangerous. The forecast identified near, mid, and far term threats and specified the type of

threats: diplomatic, economic, or military. Based on these results the forecasting system was considered robust enough to test against a historical example.

The forecast provided in the hypothetical case study was made in a sterile environment with easily understood examples. It did not consider the element of time and its numbing effect on threat forecasting and perception. Determining viability of the forecasting system must be done using historical case studies. One case study was selected to test the viability of the forecasting system. The historical case selected was the competition and conflict between Great Britain and Germany 1815 to 1914. This case study occurred in the modern era with abundant documentation of the events. Varied opinions on causes exist challenging any forecast system to determine the relationship of basic orientation, hostile intent, capabilities, catalysts, and vital interests. Additionally, the case study allows the forecasting system, under consideration, to look at an evolving relationship occurring over an extended period.

V. Historical Case Study

The final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo left Britain in an uncontested economic, diplomatic, and military position. Supported by a numerically and technologically superior navy, Britain easily protected and promoted its vital interests. Britain was the first nation to reach a take-off stage economy leading the world into the industrial revolution and controlling vast international markets.¹⁹ It was the economic center of the world. Combining military strength and economic power, Britain diplomatically dictated to the rest of the world. In today's terms Britain was perhaps the world's first superpower.

Germany was not a nation state but an aggregate of numerous free cities, electorates, margravates, duchies, grand duchies and five Kingdoms: Prussia, Hanover, Saxony, Wurttemberg and Bavaria.²⁰ Control of the region was greatly influenced by Austria, France, Russia, and Britain. Prussia was the strongest of the German states, but it was unable to establish leadership over the fractionalized federation because of the threat of intervention by the aforementioned nation states.

The British and Prussians, allies during the multiple Napoleonic Wars, shared mutual interests of maintaining the role of monarchies, defeating Napoleon, and reducing France's ability to dictate economic and diplomatic policy over the continent. There was mutual support for the political aims of the Treaties of Paris and the First Congress of Vienna.²¹ Some latent tensions existed over territorial accession of the Kingdom of Hanover and the German Federation. However, these were not sufficient to pose any threat or near term rift among the nation states.

This is the initial historical setting. It superficially contains the perceptions of both nation states. This is sufficient to begin an in-depth analysis using the purposed forecasting system

Selected for analysis are major events or catalysts. The forecasting system needs to interpret these events capturing the changing reality and perceptions of nation states.

The year 1816 is selected because it closely followed the final defeat of Napoleon and the First Congress of Vienna, both establishing the parameters for a new world order. It was a time of turmoil and political uncertainty. Nations faced an unknown future as the balance of power had significantly changed within the period of a year. Threat perceptions of Britain and Prussia were different. Applying the filter to 1816 Britain is shown in Figure 4.

Potential Threat Matrix - Britain 1816

| Nation State | Basic Orientation | Intent | Capabilities | Catalyst | Potential Threats yes/no |
|--------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|----------|--------------------------|
| France | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Austria | No | No | No | No | No |
| Prussia | No | No | No | No | No |
| Russia | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| U. S. | Yes | No | No | No | No |

Figure 4²²

A quick review shows one potential threat to Britain, France. Having a hostile basic orientation, hostile intent, and capabilities, France even in defeat was seen as the principle threat to Britain. The Treaty of Alliance signed 20 November 1815 captures the perception of the French threat.

...to maintain in full vigor, and should it be necessary, with the whole of their forces, the permanent exclusion of Napoleon and his family from the throne of France, promising to concert necessary measures in case the same Revolutionary Principles, which upheld the last criminal usurpation, should again, under other forms convulse France. ²³

Other nation states, including Prussia, were considered non-threats lacking current and future capabilities. Moreover, they shared a common fear of France. This bond focused hostile intent and orientation on France. As a result British vital interests remained secure behind geopolitical isolation, its navy, and a fragmented and war weary Europe.

Prussia, on the other hand, was sandwiched between hostile neighbors of France, Austria, and Russia. It acknowledged fully Austria's power and was deferential in all cases of disputes with its neighbor. Prussia's support of the allied cause provided new territories, while acquiescing, to stronger neighbors its claims on and influence in Poland. Having insufficient economic or military power, Prussia had to make the best of diplomatic efforts to mediate an environment controlled by others.

Applying the filter to the Prussian situation shows the following:

Potential Threat Matrix - Prussia 1816

| Nation State | Basic Orientation | Intent | Capabilities | Catalyst | Potential Threat yes/no |
|--------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|----------|-------------------------|
| France | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Austria | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Britain | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Russia | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| U. S. | No | No | No | No | No |

Figure 5

Note that Prussia has several potential threats, but not Britain. Shared boundaries, unanswered questions of German Federation, and conflicting spheres of influence drive Prussia's estimate of potential threats.

The forecasting system also requires an analysis of the vital interests of potential threats. The initial analysis concluded that both Britain and Prussia consider the other a non-threat. Further analysis is not necessary and the effort should focus on potential threats. For development of the case study vital interests will be compared. The comparison should reconfirm the filter's pre-assessment.

British vital interests were: 1.) lines of communications throughout the its British Empire; 2.) a stable Europe; 3.) protection of British markets; and 4.) retention of colonies.²⁴ To prosper and survive, the British Empire needed free access to its colonies and trading partners. This required a stable but fragmented Europe with no single power in control of the European economic ports of entry (Amsterdam, Antwerp, and Rotterdam).²⁵ A protectionist policy using tariffs and regulations insured a growing economy. Britain was leery of a new French rebellion, nationalist movements, and the pressures on monarchies to liberalize. It supported existing monarchies and the European status quo.

Prussia's vital interests were: 1.) a stable Europe; 2.) unification of Germany; 3.) Prussian unity; and 4.) preservation of the Monarchy.²⁶ Prussian unity was paramount. The First Congress of Vienna allowed Prussia to assimilate new land and populations. Dividing the spoils was not popular among peoples having different allegiances. The unification of Germany would wait until Prussia had secured an expanded homeland. Prussian efforts to unify Germany were limited to economic initiatives providing common tariffs among the German states.²⁷ A stable Europe was needed to accomplish the task and monarchies were seen as stabilizing.

Comparing British and Prussian vital interests in a matrix illustrates the similarities of vital interests between the nation states:

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX 1816

| Britain Prussia | LOCs | Stable Europe | Protection of Markets | Access to Colonies |
|----------------------------|---------|---------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Stable Europe | neutral | shared | neutral | neutral |
| Unification of Germany | shared | shared | neutral | neutral |
| Prussian Unity | shared | shared | neutral | neutral |
| Perservation of Monarchies | neutral | shared | neutral | neutral |

Figure 6

Britain and Prussia shared the desire for a stable Europe without the influence of a French Republic or Napoleon. Britain supported the unification of Germany as a means to achieve stability, balance, and protect the status quo. Other vital interest are neutral having little or no impact on each other. Thus, in 1816 neither Britain nor Prussia would have seen the other as a potential or likely threat. Shared vital interests drove them to be co-signatories of the Treaty of Alliance of 1820.

The next selected point is 1871. As with the 1816, 1871 signaled a turning point in European history. Understanding the changes culminating in 1871 requires a review of preceding events.

In 1830 Belgium declared its independence from the Netherlands. Britain and Prussia supported Belgium and guaranteed its neutrality.²⁸ British interests in Belgium were free access to the Channel and North Sea ports. Prussia saw a neutral Belgium as an additional buffer between it and a resurgent France.²⁹

The wide spread revolts of 1848 further shaped events. A Bonaparte returned to lead France and liberal reforms were forced on the European monarchies. The revolts left all monarchies susceptible to radical changes. The Prussian military victories of 1864 and 1866 warned of growing military and diplomatic capabilities. Still British perceptions of Prussia remained unchanged as no direct threat was posed to its vital interests.

The Prussian victory over France, unification of Germany, and formation of a German Empire culminated shifts in the European balance of power. The new Germany was recognized as a legitimate military and diplomatic power with growing economic capabilities. A forecast for Britain in 1871 is shown in Figure 7.

Potential Threat Matrix - Britain 1871

| Nation State | Basic Orientation | Intent | Capabilities | Catalyst | Potential threat yes no |
|--------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|----------|----------------------------|
| France | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Austria | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Germany | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Russia | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| U. S. | No | No | No | No | No |
| Japan | No | No | No | No | No |
| Italy | No | No | No | No | No |

Figure 7

The filter process integrates the new nation states of Italy, Germany, and Japan. The number of potential threats to Britain increased from France in 1816, to four potential threats a half century later. The most serious remained France, but there was increased concern for Europe and growing German power.³⁰

The German situation is different having recently defeating Austria and France (Figure 8). Hostility, fear, and hostile basic orientation ran high in all three nation states and a Franco-Austrian alliance was possible. Germany saw France and Austria as separate threats but the alliance of the two was seen as the greater and more immediate threat.³¹ A potential for Russian intervention in the Balkans and in Europe always existed and that threat is reflected in the matrix.

Potential Threat Matrix - Germany 1871

| Nation State | Basic Orientation | Intent | Capabilities | Catalyst | Potential threat yes no |
|--------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|----------|----------------------------|
| France | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Austria | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Britain | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Russia | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| U. S. | No | No | No | No | No |
| Japan | No | No | No | No | No |
| Italy | No | No | No | No | No |

Figure 8

Completing the filter process, note Britain considers Germany a potential threat while Germany does not have the same perception. The variance in the perceptions is a dynamic of geopolitical position. Britain is isolated from the continent by the English Channel and the Royal

Navy. Germany shares long contiguous borders with numerous potential threats. German threats are immediate concerns because of their proximity. Britain has the advantage of time and space taking a long and less urgent view.³²

Since the filter suggests Germany is a potential threat, a comparison of vital interests is more relevant than the first review. British vital interests evolved but did not radically change. The vital interests of open lines of communications, protection of British markets, and access and expansion of colonies remained. The requirement for a stable Europe evolved into a requirement for a balance of power. Nicholas Mansergh, a British historian and author, captures the essence of this vital interest stating:

When an Englishman speaks of a need to maintain a Balance of Power in Europe he means, not the maintenance of an exact scientific balance but rather the perpetuation of a system in which the weight of England is sufficient to bring down the scales on which ever side it is thrown.³³

British vital interests on the continent were best served by a multipolar Europe of relatively equal nation states. An illustration of the Balance of Power strategy is the Crimean War. When Russia threatened the balance and access to the Black Sea, Britain led a coalition to defeat Russian in 1854.

German vital interests were changed by the wars of unification and the Franco-Prussian War. Germany was unified under a Prussian Monarch and its most threatening enemy France, had been defeated. Under the direction of Prince Otto Von Bismarck German vital interests changed to meet the demands of a new nation state. Those vital interests were: 1.) protection of German markets; 2.) a balance of power; 3.) preservation of the Monarch and the Empire; and 4.) continued isolation of France.³⁴

A comparison of vital interests is shown in Figure 9. Using the previous examples it is clear that Britain and Germany now have competing vital interests. Different interpretations and applications of balance of power and unilateral protection of markets signal a change in the relationship. The forecasting system is alerting Britain that Germany is a likely threat. Charles D. Hazen, a contemporary historian, captured Germany's changed status writing:

By decisiveness of the campaign and by the momentous character of its consequences, Prussia (Germany) hitherto regarded as the least important great powers had astounded Europe by evidence of her strength. She possessed a remarkable Army and a remarkable statesman.³⁵

No overt hostile intent is noted between the states. However, a foundation, based on competing vital interests has been set for its development. Germany is too close to recent events to perceive a long term threat from Britain, but it is still there nonetheless. Competing vital interests underscore a change in the relationship. The course of the relationship is set as events and catalysts after 1871.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - 1871

| Britain Germany | LOCs | Balance of Power | Protection of Markets | Access to Colonies |
|----------------------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Balance of Power | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | neutral |
| Protection of Markets | neutral | neutral | in conflict | neutral |
| Perservation of Monarchies | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Isolation of France | neutral | shared | neutral | neutral |

Figure 9

Prince Otto von Bismarck engineered an alliance with Austria, in which Italy soon became the third partner. The alliance served the vital interests of all partners, isolating France. Bismarck strove to convince the other great powers that Germany had no further European territorial ambitions.³⁶

In 1888 Wilhelm I was succeeded by his grandson Wilhelm II and within two years Bismarck was dismissed.³⁷ A catalytic event that would impact on the relationship. Bismarck understood the power of Britain warning against naval competition and the need to maintain friendly relations.³⁸ A new policy of Welt-Politik defined a larger role for Germany based on the Wilhelm's belief that "Germany was absurdly restricted in proportion to the intellectual vigor, physical robustness, and military superiority of the nation".³⁹ Manifestation of Welt-Politik was an increasing number of colonies, a merchant marine, and a navy to protect them both.⁴⁰ The Kaiser's remarks again signaled a shift citing a need for a strong German Fleet and a predictions that Germany's future lay on the water.⁴¹ He addressed Germany's role in Europe as a "Napoleonic supremacy in a peaceful sense".⁴² These provocative statements were supported by aggressive naval bills in 1896, 1898, and 1900. The naval build-up coincided with the "Kruger Telegram" inciting hostile orientations in Germany and Britain.⁴³ By this time no doubt remained that serious competition existed between Britain and Germany.

Germany had triggered key components of the filter: basic orientation, hostile intent, and capabilities, instigated by catalysts of the fall of Bismarck and the rise of Wilhelm II. Applying the forecasting system to the conditions of 1901 identifies the following potential threats to Britain (Figure 10).

Potential Threat Matrix - Britain 1901

| Nation State | Basic Orientation | Intent | Capabilities | Catalyst | Potential Threat yes no |
|--------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|----------|----------------------------|
| France | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Austria | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Germany | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Russia | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| U. S. | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Japan | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Italy | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Figure 10

Clearly, Germany became the main threat, combining all factors which define a potential threat. Austria and Italy are considered potential threats as a result of their alliance with Germany. The proximity of the Fashoda Affair ranks France as a potential threat.⁴⁴ Notice in the evaluation the growing number of nation states possessing capabilities to impact on British vital interests. The increase in capabilities is a reflection of the challenge to Britain's leadership in an evolving multipolar world.⁴⁵

Potential Threat Matrix - Germany 1901

| Nation State | Basic Orientation | Intent | Capabilities | Catalyst | Potential Threat yes no |
|--------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|----------|----------------------------|
| France | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Austria | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Britain | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Russia | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| U. S. | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Japan | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Italy | No | No | Yes | No | No |

Figure 11

Germany's review of potential threats in 1901 is captured in Figure 11. Germany faces multiple potential threats of its own creation. In 1871 France was the main threat and remained so in 1901. Yet, relations with Russia soured driving a rapprochement with France and naval arms race with Britain created a new potential threat. Geopolitically, Germany was surrounded by potential threats. The victories of 1864, 1866, 1871, and Bismarck's diplomacy, had successfully isolated the main threat. In the span of ten years (1890-1900) the situation radically changed and

Germany faced a resurgent France, a French-Russian alliance, and gave challenge to the most powerful nation of the time.⁴⁶

British vital interests remained virtually unchanged since 1871: 1.) lines of communication; 2.) protection of markets; 3.) a balance of power; and 4.) access to colonies. Germany's interests evolved with changing role played in and outside Europe. German vital interests in 1901 were: 1.) promotion of Welt-Politik; 2.) protection of markets; 3.) a balance of power; and 4.) protection of the monarchy.⁴⁷

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - 1901

| Britain Germany | LOCs | Balance of Power | Protection of Markets | Access to Colonies |
|--------------------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Balance of Power | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | neutral |
| Protection of Markets | neutral | in conflict | in conflict | neutral |
| Perservation of Monarchy | neutral | in conflict | in conflict | neutral |
| Welt-Politik | in conflict | in conflict | neutral | in conflict |

Figure 12

The comparison of vital interests in 1901 is shown in Figure 12. Germany and Britain are likely threats to one another. Vital interests are in conflict. Each sees the other with distrust and competition is likely to continue until mitigated by war or diplomatic rapprochement. Britain would view Germany as the main and immediate threat challenging its vital interests. Germany would see Britain as one of several threats of which France/Russia are the most immediate. In a multipolar world the perception of threat varies from nation state to nation state depending on the variables of geopolitical position, proximity, alliances, and capabilities of the threat. In Germany's view France with a large army, allied with Russia posed the major threat. Britain views Germany as the major threat with a visible fleet build-up, diplomatic challenges, and an aggressive economic program⁴⁸.

The German threat posed to Britain evolved over an extended period. The forecasting system identified a changed relationship long before an easily recognizable challenge developed in 1901. Time and the pace of change have a numbing effect on a nation state's ability to identify threats.⁴⁹ Nation states caught by surprise, on the international scene, fail to accurately forecast threats. The result of that failure is a miscalculated use of the elements of national power in a crisis. The British response to the German challenge used a single element of national power, a

massive naval build-up. This reaction handcuffed other options contributing to the conflagration of World War I. Their militant reaction was precipitated by the immediacy of the threat. Had the forecasting system been used, recognition of the challenge could have occurred earlier, availing Britain other options. In 1871 an analyst stating that Germany was a threat to Britain would have been scoffed. In 1901 that appreciation was accepted reasoning. However, the evidence was already available in 1871 to make the forecast. Clearly, the impact of not anticipating and preparing for threats can be disastrous. There was a need then and now for a forecasting system allowing decision makers time, opportunity, and options to deal with likely threats.

Standards were set for determining validity of the forecasting system in the hypothetical case study and they are applicable to the historical case study. Those standards were: 1.) identify potential threats; 2.) consider the impact of events and catalysts; and 3.) identify likely threats in sufficient time to prepare strategies. Evaluating the forecasting system against the case study shows: 1.) the system identified potential threats verified by historical accounts; 2.) it highlighted and considered the catalytic events of 1830, 1848, 1864-1866, 1870, and 1888, and the impacts they had on Germany and Britain; and 3.) it identified Germany as a likely threat to Britain in 1871 prior to the start of degradation of the relationship in 1890. The "so what factor" immediately comes to mind. Armed with a forecasting system, a possibility existed for a long term, less confrontational grand strategy that might have altered the relationship. There were more vehicles available to peacefully mediate the relationship in 1871 than in 1901. It is an opportunity that cannot be recovered. The issue facing the United States is: what opportunities are we missing?

The application of the forecasting system to the case study has the advantage of hind sight. The evaluations were made with complete knowledge of the end state and direction of each event. However, the forecasting system was applied with knowledge available to the policy or decision maker at the time. When and where possible the pervasive perceptions were considered showing the impact on the development of potential and likely threats. Taking this into consideration, the forecasting system identified potential threats and suggested likely threats. The system also identified the differences in threat perception between the two nation states and considered the impact of a unipolar and then a multipolar world. An ulterior motive for selection of this case study is the similarity of the British position of the early and mid 1800s to that of the United States today. In 1816 Britain was a certified superpower. It faced an ambiguous threat environment. Domestic demands required an inward focus. Over time a threat developed which Britain addressed with a military strategy. The other elements of national power were less used and options to resolve conflicting vital interests reduced with time. There was no means for Britain to identify threats in sufficient time to allow the development of coherent strategies.

Establishing that the forecast system has validity in a selected historical case study, the next step is to stress it by forecasting in the ambiguous environment facing the United States over the next ten years to twenty years.

VI. The Forecast for the United States

Executing the forecasting system for the United States requires that all nation states be evaluated against the filter and the quantifying mathematical expressions. A nation state by nation state evaluation is at Annex B. Analysis of the filter process provides the following:

- There are 209 current nation states (ΣN) and at least five non-nation states (ΣN^2).⁵⁰
- One hundred and ninety-four are considered non-threat nation states and non-nation states (ΣNT).
- Eleven nation states were evaluated as having hostile basic orientations directed at the United States (ΣB).
- Seven were evaluated as having hostile intent impacting vital interests of the United States (ΣI).
- Forty-five were assessed with capabilities to impact the vital interests of the United States (ΣC).
- Seventy-seven nation states had some catalyst event on-going potentially impacting their actions (ΣCE).
- Twenty meet requirements as potential threats (ΣP).

The filter reduces 214 entities to twenty nation states and non-nation states that meet parameters as potential threats (P). Ninety percent of the nation states reviewed do not currently present a threat to the United States. Because of constrained resources, these states should receive less attention than those identified as potential threats. The process has reduced the specter of errant speculation and focused decision makers on a manageable set of problem states. The filter process has identified the following as potential threats to the United States:

| <u>Potential Threats Nation States</u> | | | | <u>Potential Threats Non-Nation States</u> |
|--|--------------|-------|-------------|--|
| China | Kazakstan | India | North Korea | Drug Cartel |
| Russia | Cuba | Iran | Pakistan | Religious Strife |
| Ukraine | South Africa | Iraq | Vietnam | Mass Migration |
| Byelorussia | Syria | Japan | Nicaragua | |
| | | Libya | | |

Figure 13

A review of the potential threat states reveals:

- Seven are Asian Nation States, two from Africa, three each are from Europe and the Mid-East, while two are Central or South American Nation States, and three are non-nation states threats.

- Eleven have developed nuclear power industries and have the capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

- Five nation states have stockpiles of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery means.

- Five additional nation states have nuclear weapons stockpiles and the capability to delivery them intra-theater.

- Four nation states are attempting to develop nuclear weapons and delivery means.

- Seven are assessed as having active chemical and biological weapons programs.

- Twelve nation states have modern standing armies.

- Five nation states or non-nation states are involved in state terrorism.

- One nation state is a major economic competitor.

These potential threats cross a wide diplomatic, economic, and military spectrum requiring a response from all elements of the United States national power. The single monolithic threat focus is replaced by one which is ambiguous and varied calling for a wider range of capabilities and responses. The filter has narrowed the consideration to a set of potential threat states eliminating the need to try to focus on the total sum of nation states.

Some consideration was given to the best means to review these potential threats (Figure 18). To identify them is not sufficient. They must be placed in some useful context prior to further evaluation. The new administration has chosen a prioritized approach, using tiers. This approach provides the State Department as a means to prioritize foreign policy initiatives. However, it is not a useful means for review because it does not capture the dynamics of non-nations states nor the regional demands and perspectives. The best means to further review the threats is in the context of areas of responsibility (AOR) of the United States Unified Commands. A list of potential threats aggregated by Unified Commands is shown in Figure 19 and will be reviewed starting with the European Command after specifying the vital interests of the United States.

Comparing the vital interests of the United State and each potential threat will reduce the number of potential threats to a likely set of threats.

The vital interests of the United States articulated in the National Security Strategy are:

- 1.) The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
- 2.) A healthy and growing United States economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and aboard.

3.) Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations

4.) A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.⁵¹

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| EUCOM Russia Ukraine Byelorussia Kazakhstan Religious Strife* Libya South Africa Mass Migration | CENTCOM Iran Iraq Syria Pakistan Religious Strife* | PACOM China North Korea Japan Vietnam India Drug Cartel* Religious Strife* |
| LANTCOM Cuba Drug Cartel* | SOUTHCOM Nicaragua Drug Cartel* | |

*non-nation states

Figure 14

The European Command (EUCOM) stretches from Norway to South Africa and from Iceland to Russia. Its area of responsibility (AOR) contains the new nation states of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and number of ongoing and potential conflicts impacting the vital interests of the United States. The potential threats in EUCOM's (AOR) are: Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, Mass Migration, and Religious Strife. Analysis of vital interests begins with the republics of the former Soviet Union.

The demise of the Soviet Union and creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) shifted the balance of power. The CIS is fragile and its members have little allegiance or much desire to obey the central government in cases of conflicting interests. Nationalistic, democratic, and independence movements are the hallmark of this environment. The United States can look on this as progress or as unsuitability or both. The unresolved issue of control of nuclear weapons and the monumental problems of institutional transition are critical issues facing the CIS. Boris Yeltsin's reforms are under constant challenge from the Russian Parliament and the military, all contributing to the uncertainty and instability. Additionally, to obtain hard currency many of the former republics are selling large quantities of conventional weapons to the Mid and Far East. Out of this dangerous environment four former Soviet Republics are considered potential threats: Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan. A review of each begins with Russia.

Russia's vital interests are: 1.) promote and maintain leadership of the CIS and sustain Russia's role as a world power; 2.) ensure survival of the Russian state and protection of Russian

peoples in all the former Soviet republics; 3.) realign the economy, obtain access to foreign markets and hard currency, and access to lines of communications; and 4.) achieve stability in Europe and Asia that allows economic reforms to begin.⁵² A comparison of Russian vital interests with those of the United State is highlighted in Figure 15.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - RUSSIA

| Russia United States | Leadership of CIS/World Role | Survival of Russian State | Market Economy | Stability in Region |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | In conflict | neutral | neutral | <i>Shared</i> |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | neutral | <i>Shared</i> | <i>Shared</i> |
| Healthy relations with allies | In conflict | neutral | neutral | <i>Shared</i> |
| Stable world | In conflict | In conflict | neutral | <i>Shared</i> |

Figure 15

The comparison highlights an evolving relationship between Russia and the United States. A similar matrix done in 1988 would have shown most of the vital interests in conflict. A major shift expedited by a failed coup, demise of the Soviet Union, and the Persian Gulf War changed the relationship. However, a large stockpile of nuclear weapons, multiple delivery means, and fragile government make Russia a likely threat in the near term. Additionally, to obtain needed capital Russia is selling sophisticated conventional military equipment to any bidder and this contributes to instability. Potential United States-Russian confrontation exists over means to solve the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Russian sympathies are firmly behind the Serbians, while the United States is leaning toward an anti-Serbian stance.

The ends, ways, and means of dealing with the Russian threat have changed. A number of shared vital interests are drawing the countries closer together. Delicate diplomatic and economic initiatives are needed to ensure Russia does not regress. A reactionary Russia is not in the vital interests of the United States. The relationship is dynamic and under constant change. The forecasting system must be constantly applied to detect the slightest deviation or change in the current relationship.⁵³

The Ukraine has long term nationalistic tendencies. The breakup of the Soviet Union has allowed those tendencies to surface. The Ukraine is becoming an independent nation state. It was considered a threat having nuclear delivery means, a larger standing army, and a very uncertain diplomatic, political, and economic future. Ukraine's vital interests are: 1.) survival of the Ukraine as an independent and free state; 2.) develop a market economy with access to

foreign markets and hard currency; 3.) stability within the region allowing economic recovery and continuing governmental reform; and 4.) resolve control of former Soviet military assets within territorial bounds.⁵⁴ A comparison of these vital interests with those of the United States is shown in Figure 16.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - UKRAINE

| Ukraine United States | Economic Recovery | Stable Region and Stable World Economy | Ukraine a free and independent state | Control of Soviet Weapons |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--|---|------------------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | Shared | neutral | Shared |
| Healthy Economy | Shared | Shared | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | neutral | Shared | neutral | neutral |
| Stable world | Shared | Shared | Shared | Shared |

Figure 16

The Ukraine and the United States share a number of vital interests. These shared vital interests could afford a closer relationship. As with Russia, economic and diplomatic elements of power are the best means to foster that relationship. The Ukraine, while a potential threat, is not a likely threat. The Ukraine remains volatile and difficult negotiations remain between Russia and the Ukraine on military and economic issues. Additionally, the Ukraine's role and attitudes toward the former Yugoslavia are unclear. The fact that the Ukraine is not a likely threat does not mean it should be forgotten in subsequent reviews.

Byelorussia or Belorussia has a long history of being subjugated between warring states of Europe. Its national identity has been submerged in struggles for territory between Russia, Poland, and Austria. Its identity as a free independent state is one of the vital interests of this new nation state. Byelorussia was considered a potential threat because it controls intercontinental ballistic missiles combined with the inherent instability within Russia and the region. Its evolving vital interests are: 1.) the independence of Byelorussia while maintaining close political ties with Russia; 2.) successful economic transition to a market economy developing close economic ties with Germany and the Ukraine; 3.) access to regional and foreign markets; and 4.) create a stable regional environment by becoming a nuclear free state.⁵⁵ A comparison of these vital interest is shown in Figure 17.

Byelorussia shares vital interests with the United States. The economic and diplomatic elements of power are required to move the relationship closer. There is potential for the a long term friendly relationship between these nation states. Byelorussia is not considered a likely threat

now or in the future. However, as with all the new nation states within the former Soviet Union, instability coupled with residual cold war capabilities requires frequent application of the forecasting system.

VITAL INTERESTS MATRIX - BYELORUS

| Byelorus United States | Economic Transition | Stable Region | Access to Regional and Foreign Markets | Survival of Byelorus |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|--|----------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | Shared | neutral | Shared | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | neutral | Shared | neutral | neutral |
| Stable world | neutral | Shared | neutral | Shared |

Figure 17

Kazakstan is the last of the former Soviet Republics considered a potential threat. It is also the least stable of the Commonwealth states retaining nuclear capabilities and thus a potential threat. An ongoing religious and racial civil war threatens intervention by Russia and the Muslim states to the south. It shares a long border with China who is concerned that the instability of Russia and Kazakstan may spill into its territory. Determining vital interests in this turmoil is difficult. The likely vital interests of Kazakstan are: 1.) resolution of internal strife and conflict; 2.) maintain close economic and diplomatic ties with Russia; 3.) obtain stability in the region with peaceful resolution of Muslim/Christian strife; and 4.) rebuild the economy.⁵⁶ A comparison of vital interests with those of the United States is shown below.

VITAL INTERESTS MATRIX - KAZAKSTAN

| Kazakstan United States | Resolution of internal strife | Close Ties with Russia | Stable Region | Economic Recovery |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | neutral | neutral | Shared |
| Healthy relations with allies | neutral | neutral | Shared | Shared |
| Stable world | Shared | neutral | Shared | Shared |

Kazakstan, with all of its internal instability and Intercontinental ballistic systems, is not a likely threat to United State's vital interests. They share a number of vital interests. Kazakstan's myopic focus on internal problems will keep it occupied for a considerable time. The volatile nature of the conflict evolving Muslim and Christian is a regional problem. There is the potential for the conflict to spread causing a major international situation. The forecasting system must anticipate religious movements and the ability to unite peoples across nation states boundaries.

Libya has sponsored state terrorism against the vital interests of the United States and there have been minor clashes, including a United States raid in 1982. Libya's incursion into Chad and support of the Islamic fundamentalist government in Sudan show a continuing aggressive stance. Libya was assessed as a potential threat because of hostile basic orientation and intent coupled with growing capabilities. Libya's vital interests are: 1.) Pan Arab unity under Qaddafi; 2.) removal of western influences from the region; 3.) lead the movement against Israel, leverage this stance for greater leadership role among Arab states; and 4.) foster a Libyan style of Islamic fundamentalism.⁵⁷ A comparison of vital interests is shown in Figure 19.

VITAL INTERESTS MATRIX - LIBYA

| Libya United States | Pan Arab Leadership | Remove Western Influence | Leading Role Against Israel | Libyan Style of Fundamentalism |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |
| Healthy relations with allies | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |
| Stable world | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |

Figure 19

There are serious conflicting vital interests between the nation states. The stance against Israel and attempts to remove western influence conflict with United States vital interests of a stable world, healthy economy, and support to allies. There are no significant changes that mitigate these conflicts. Libya is and will remain a likely threat.

South Africa was considered a threat because of its capabilities and instability caused by racial tensions. South Africa is internationally isolated because of its past apartheid policy. Its geopolitical position, economic and military capabilities, and policies of racial separation have made it a focal point. South Africa's vital interests are: 1.) ensure the survival of South Africa as independent state under minority rule; 2.) control economy of the region; 3.) protect and isolate South Africa from instability of the region; and 4.) change world opinion by reducing emphasis on

apartheid while continuing the policy.⁵⁸ A comparison of vital interests with those of the United States is shown in Figure 20.

VITAL INTERESTS MATRIX - SOUTH AFRICA

| South Africa United States | Survival of South Africa | Center of Economic Power | Change World Public Opinion | Protect and Isolate South Africa |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | In Conflict | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | In Conflict | In Conflict | In Conflict | In Conflict |
| Stable world | In Conflict | In Conflict | In Conflict | In Conflict |

Figure 20

South Africa is a likely threat to the United State's vital interests now and in the future. At issue will be the continued policy of denying majority rule and economic and military control of the region. Currently, the United States is using its economic and diplomatic elements of power to engage the threat.

The next focus is Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM is currently the busiest of our Unified Commands with operations ongoing in Somalia and Iraq. Its AOR contains most of the volatile Middle-East. Four nation states and two non-nation states were considered potential threats in CENTCOM's AOR: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, Drug Cartels, and Religious Strife. The vital interests comparison begins with Iran.

Iran's vital interests are: 1.) promotion of Islamic fundamentalism and a greater Islamic State; 2.) build a healthy economy with the cooperation of other Arab states; and 3.) control of the Shatt-Al-Arab and if necessary control access to the Persian Gulf.⁵⁹ The vital interest matrix, Figure 21, reveals areas of potential agitation between the nation states.

Since the overthrow of the Shah, Iran has focused its hostile basic orientation on the west and the United States. Mining of the Gulf, minor clashes of forces, and the Vincennes incident underscore these hostile feelings. Iran's anti-western stance and promotion Islamic fundamentalism are in direct conflict with the United State's vital interest of a stable world, healthy relations with allies, and a growing economy. Iran has charted a course to increase its power and influence in the region. Military capabilities including surface to surface missiles, increased interest in the southern tier of the former Soviet Union, and support of religious fundamentalist in Sudan are clear examples of Iran's expanding role in the region. Iran's geopolitical position, oil

reserves, and growing interest in the Islamic/Christian clashes in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia make it a nation state deserving of considerable attention by the forecasting system. Iran is a likely threat now and in the foreseeable future.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - IRAN

| Iran United States | Economic Recovery | Promotion of Islamic Fundamentalism | Control of the Shatt-Al-Arab and Access to Persian Gulf |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | in conflict | in conflict |
| Healthy relations with allies | neutral | in conflict | in conflict |
| Stable world | neutral | in conflict | in conflict |

Figure 21

The relationship between Iraq and the United States is well documented. The nation states currently confront each other over a number of issues. Iraq has hostile basic orientation, intent, diminished but still viable capabilities, and is in the midst of catalyst events whose end-state is not determined. Iraq's vital interests are: 1.) survival and promotion of Ba'athism; 2.) end of UN sanctions and economic recovery; 3.) control of the Shatt-Al-Arab and critical resources of the region; and 4.) Pan Arab leadership. ⁸⁰

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - IRAQ

| Iraq United States | Promotion of Ba'athism | Pan-Arab Leadership | Economic Recovery & UN Sanctions | Control of Shatt-Al-Arab & Gulf |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | in conflict | in conflict | neutral | in conflict |
| Healthy relations with allies | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |
| Stable world | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |

Figure 22

A comparison of those vital interests (Figure 22) shows major conflicts rooted in the ongoing hostilities. Iraq's desire to lead the Arab world, control of vital resources and choke points, and confrontation with the West are in conflict with United States interests of a healthy economy, a stable world, and support to allies. Iraq's tacit compliance with the cease-fire agreements while attempting to lift UN sanctions has been and will be a source of conflict between the nation states. Iraq's aggressive nature, political ambitions, and geopolitical position make it a likely threat for many years.

Syria was considered a potential threat because it combines hostile basic orientation with growing capabilities. While a serving ally during the Gulf War, the relationship between the nation states is tenuous. Syria's stance against the state of Israel and past support of terrorism are major points of confrontation. Syria's vital interests are: 1.) strengthen its economy by seeking new economic partners; 2.) continue to lead Arab Front against Israel; 3.) keep Assad and the Ba'ath Party in power; and 3.) develop and maintain Syria as a regional power.⁶¹ A comparison shows conflicting vital interests (Figure 23).

| VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - SYRIA | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| Syria United States | Economic Recovery | Lead Against Israel | Retain Leadership of Syria | Maintain Syria as a Regional Power |
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | neutral | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |
| Stable world | neutral | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |

Figure 23

Syria's continued threat to Israel and desire for leadership in the Arab world place vital interests of the United States at risk. Syria's unrelenting efforts to improve military capabilities vis-a-vis Israel and its neighbors makes Syria a likely threat now and in the future.

Pakistan is a country that has received large amounts of military aid and diplomatic support from the United States. A neutral India, a Soviet controlled Afghanistan, and a hostile Iran dominated the region and Pakistan was the United State's only option to maintain a presence and wield some influence in the region. Pakistan was the willing conduit for United States support of Afghan guerrillas. Recently, the relationship has been stressed by the development of a Pakistani nuclear capability. Continued tensions with India nearly led to a near nuclear

confrontation in the later part of 1990.⁶² The combination of internal and external instability, an active drug cartel operation, and a nuclear capability make Pakistan a potential threat.

Pakistan's vital interests are: 1.) maintain Pakistan as an independent state exercising influence in the region; 2.) promote and protect Islam and obtain closer ties with new Muslim states; 3.) maintain access to regional and foreign markets; and 4.) ensure stability in Afghanistan and the region.⁶³ A comparison of vital interests is shown in Figure 24.

VITAL INTERESTS MATRIX - PAKISTAN

| Pakistan United States | Maintain Pakistan as an Independent State | Protect Muslim Religion | Access to Regional & Foreign Markets | Stable Region |
|-------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------|--|------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | neutral | Shared | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | Shared | neutral | neutral | Shared |
| Stable world | neutral | In conflict | neutral | Shared |

Figure 24

Pakistan and the United States share vital interests and Pakistan is not a likely threat. An unresolved and dangerous issue is the growing religiously motivated conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans. As a Muslim state, Pakistan has had strong ties with Iran and it will aggressively enter into issues where Muslim interests are in danger. At the same time there is an internal undertow of radical religious fundamentalism actively competing for leadership. These fundamentalist elements promote closer ties with Iran. This catalyst has the ability to change Pakistan's posture. Southern regions support a drug operations adversely impacting on the vital interests of the United States. Pakistan's interest in the fate of Muslims in India and the long running quarrels with India over Kashmir cannot be overlooked. The possibility of a nuclear confrontation always exists between these nation states and it is the main destabilizing catalyst in the region. Pakistan requires frequent reevaluations to determine its status.

Pacific Command (PACOM) has the largest AOR stretching from the Alaska to India. PACOM has several diverse threats requiring vital interests comparisons: China, Japan, India, North Korea, Vietnam, and the Drug Cartel. Comparisons will begin with the most populous of nation states, China.

The former competing superpowers sought China's geopolitical position and potential capabilities to gain shifts in the balance of power. As a result China's relationship with the United

States has pivoted from hostility to cooperation. Its enormous capability, unlimited potential, and historical basic orientation directed against the West make it a potential threat.

China assumes leadership of Communism in a changed environment. Anticipating change and a front row witness to the problems of the former Soviet Union, China is reevaluating communist doctrine. It is fashioning an economy integrating the best of authoritarian and market systems. China limits liberalization with tight controls on the population and its other elements national power. This policy may lead to internal stresses like that experienced in Tienanmen Square in 1990.

China has the largest standing armed force in the world. Limited access to technology has prevented that force from becoming a world class projection force. That is changing. Developing indigenous capabilities and access to western technology have significantly increased capabilities. Potential sale of former Soviet major surface elements could provide the Chinese an immediate power projection force. Unresolved territorial issues with Vietnam and claims to the Spratly Islands are immediate uses of the power projection capabilities. China is closely monitoring the ongoing change in Russia and Kazakstan both of which it shares long continuous borders. Passed armed clashes with the former Soviet Union in the Amur River region are still unresolved and could be a source of confrontation in the future.

In this environment China's vital interests are: 1.) maintain the sovereignty of China; 2.) protect the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party, ⁶⁴ 3.) continue growth of Chinese authoritarian market economy; ⁶⁵ and 4.) become a global power and reduce non-Asian power influence from the region.⁶⁶ A comparison of vital interests is shown in Figure 25.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - CHINA

| China United States | Maintain China's Sovereignty | Protect Chinese Communism | Growth of Chinese Market System | Non-Asian Powers |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | in conflict | neutral | in conflict |
| Healthy relations with allies | in conflict | in conflict | neutral | in conflict |
| Stable world | neutral | in conflict | neutral | in conflict |

Figure 25

China and the United States have vital interests in conflict. China exhibits those traits of a nation state choosing to compete regionally and then globally. Increasing economic and military capabilities demonstrate China's potential to be a major threat. The vital interests of

maintaining and leading the Communist world places it at odds with stability and economic interests of the United States. Support to Taiwan remains a confrontational issue between the United States and China. Its goal of creating an authoritarian market economy is showing results. Cheap labor, a top down directed economic program, and a desire to compete will make China an economic as well as a military threat. China is major threat to the region and will become a global threat in the future.

India is improving its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons and delivery means. Purchases of surplus, but state of the art, naval units from the former Soviet Union provide India a means to project naval power into the Indian Ocean and throughout the region. India is aware of its geopolitical position marking it a nation state of growing regional importance and a potential threat.

India is in the throws of internal unrest as witnessed by the clashes between Hindus and Muslims and the a rash of recent well planned bombings in Bombay and Calcutta. This recurring instability drives a wide range of relation with its neighbors. Pakistan its major adversary, is supported by China and at times the United States. This places four powerful nation states in political confrontation. India also has boundary disputes with China serving to increase tension in the region and increasing the risk for bilateral confrontation.

India's vital interests are: 1.) become a regional power and gain influence as a leader of the third world; 2.) sustain economic growth with access to regional and foreign markets; 3.) ensure the survival of the state and Hindu leadership; and 4.) maintain regional stability.⁸⁷ A comparison of vital interests is shown in Figure 26.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - INDIA

| India United States | Become a Regional Power | Sustain Economic Growth | Stable Region | Survival of Hindu Lead State |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | <i>Shared</i> | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | In Conflict | neutral | <i>Shared</i> | neutral |
| Stable world | In Conflict | neutral | <i>Shared</i> | neutral |

Figure 26

India is a difficult forecast with its shared and conflicting vital interests. Dealing with India requires the use of economic and diplomatic elements of power. The relationship has the possibility of moving to either pole. India is a likely threat but also a possible ally. Regional

confrontation between Pakistan and/or China could have a wider impact especially if nuclear weapons are used. The United States will have to walk a tight line with its relations with India, Pakistan, and China. India will require the wise use of elements of national power and diplomacy to prevent the relationship from becoming adversarial. The difficulties and the historical dynamics of the relationship will make India a likely threat in the future.

North Korea has been a regional threat since the 1950s. The United States remains committed on the peninsula protecting South Korea. Tensions between the Koreas ebb and flow. Both nations states maintain large forces forward deployed. Recently tensions have increased as the north sees the gap between it and economically powerful south increase. North Korea's withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) are dangerous catalysts in a difficult to predict relationship. North Korea's concern with combined exercises in the south have lead to provocative statements further raising tensions. North Korea is a potential threat with a growing conventional and perhaps nuclear capabilities and hostile basic orientation directed toward the United States and its allies.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - NORTH KOREA

| North Korea United States | Reunited Korea | Protection of North Korean Dictatorship | Promote North Korean Arms Industry | Separate US interests from the Peninsula |
|-------------------------------|----------------|---|------------------------------------|--|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | In Conflict | In Conflict | neutral | In Conflict |
| Healthy relations with allies | In Conflict | In Conflict | In Conflict | In Conflict |
| Stable world | In Conflict | In Conflict | In Conflict | In Conflict |

Figure 27

The vital interests of North Korea are: 1.) a united Korea under leadership of North Korea; 2.) protection of the dictatorship and the succession Kim Jung IL; 3.) promote North Korean arms sales; and 4.) separate the United States, its forces and influence from the region.⁶⁸ A comparison of vital interests is shown in Figure 27.

North Korea is a likely threat. It contributes to world instability by selling conventional weapons to the third world. It continually threatens a major ally and wants United States interests removed from the region. While North Korean actions are hard to forecast, its threat to the region is not.

Vietnam is an old enemy. A long war was fought requiring the United States to exert a substantial amounts of its national resources. The size of the effort and failure left internal and external animosity directed toward Vietnam. Vietnamese incursions into Cambodia and Laos further heightened the sense of threat and contributed to current instability of the region. Vietnam remains a potential threat because of its geopolitical position, conventional capabilities, and hostile orientation directed to the United States and the West.

Vietnam's vital interests are: 1.) maintain the independence of Vietnam from China and reduce Chinese influence in the region; 2.) protect the dictatorship of the Vietnamese Communist Party; 3.) obtain markets and hard currency to transition from a wartime economy to peacetime economy; and 4.) retain the role as a regional power during the transition period.⁶⁸ A comparison of vital interests is shown in Figure 28.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - VIETNAM

| Vietnam United States | Independence from China | Protect Communist Leadership | Obtain Markets and Hard Currency | Role as a Regional Power |
|--|------------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | In Conflict | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | <i>Shared</i> | In Conflict | neutral | In Conflict |
| Stable world | <i>Shared</i> | In Conflict | neutral | In Conflict |

Figure 28

Vietnam and the United States have a mixture of shared and conflicting vital interests. It is a relationship that shows tendencies of moving from isolation and confrontation to dialogue. Vietnam retains an aggressive Communist government and will not hesitate to use military force in the region to promote its vital interests. These actions are in conflict with United State's vital interests. Vietnam is and will continue to be a likely threat. Yet, Vietnam seeks hard currency for an economic recovery and needs investments for improved infrastructure. It has and will seek United States assistance. This stance may serve to mitigate differences in the future.

The last nation state in PACOM to be considered a potential threat is Japan. It is a threat not in the traditional sense of strong military capabilities coupled with hostile intent. It is an economic threat as suggested by author and economist Lester Thurow in his book Head to Head. The Japanese threat is economic competition with the intent to control high growth markets and industries.⁷⁰ That capability and intent make it a potential threat unlike any other the United States has faced. Recognition has come slow and the realization that different strategies are

needed has been even slower. Japanese vital interests in this environment are: 1.) survival of Japan as a free but, homogenous state; 2.) accelerated integrationist economy with access to and control of high growth industries and technologies; 3.) sustain role of an economic superpower and increase influence in the Pacific rim; and 4.) unlimited access to lines of communications and trading partners.⁷¹ Comparing these vital interests to those of the United States is shown in Figure 29.

The vital interest matrix shows the dilemma facing United State's policy and decision makers. Japan economic policies represent a threat to the survival interests of the United States. Yet, there are a number of shared vital interests holding the nation states close. The Pacific rim that includes the economic powers of Japan and South Korea and the growing military powerful China is an area requiring increased attention. Economic cooperation or an alliance between these powers would rapidly surpass the European Community in a number of areas and could be a catalyst negatively impacting the vital interests of the United States. At the same time historical tensions and hostile basic orientation are near the surface and have the potential to drive these nations toward confrontation.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - JAPAN

| Japan United States | Survival of Japn | Integrationist Economy | Economic Superpower & Region Power | LOCs |
|-------------------------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | In Conflict | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | In Conflict | neutral | <i>Shared</i> |
| Healthy relations with allies | <i>Shared</i> | neutral | <i>Shared</i> | <i>Shared</i> |
| Stable world | <i>Shared</i> | In Conflict | neutral | <i>Shared</i> |

Figure 29

Japan is a likely threat now and in the future but not in the conventional sense. Preparing military strategies does not address the issue. It is the use of economic and diplomatic strategies addressing the Japanese threat that will mediate the differences and prepare the United States for peaceful competition and cooperation in a region of critical importance.

In the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) two entities were considered potential threats: Cuba and the Drug Cartel of Central and South America. A review of vital interests begins with Cuba.

Cuba is considered a potential threat to the United States because of its proximity, close ties to the former Soviet Union, and its aggressive support of leftist movements around the world. The demise of the Soviet Union has left Cuba without a major power partner and alone facing the United States. The vital interests of Cuba are: 1.) establish creditability and leadership in the third world; 2.) ensure survival of the state and show leadership against United States aggression; 3.) establish a growing and healthy economy; and 4.) support and encourage leftist movements in Central and South America ⁷². A comparison of Cuban and United States vital interests is shown in Figure 30.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - CUBA

| Cuba United States | Third World Leadership | Ensure Survival of Cuba | Healthy Economy | Support Leftist Movements |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | In conflict | In conflict | neutral | In conflict |
| Stable world | In conflict | In conflict | neutral | In conflict |

Figure 30

Cuba and the United States continue to have major conflicting interests. The center of the negative energy is Fidel Castro and his communist regime. The United States will see Cuba as a likely threat to stability in the region and a threat to sea lines of communications. Cuba sees the United States as a threat to its survival interests. A likely scenario for Cuba is a radical swing like that of the former Soviet Union to democracy and a market economy. The implosion of Cuba could be a large economic drain on the United States. Relations between the nation states will remain strained and Cuba is a likely threat.

Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) AOR covers Central and South America and contains a number of new democracies and regional strains and stresses. SOUTHCOM was assessed to have two potential threats: Nicaragua and the Drug Cartel.

Nicaragua has been the focus of United States Central American strategy through the 1980's. Its threat to El Salvador, close relations with Cuba, and conventional military capabilities made it a threat to United State's vital interests in the region. The tension was mitigated by the election of the Chamorro Government and the peace accord with El Salvador. Yet, contentious elements exist within Nicaragua, the Ortega brothers remain in the government and the

Sandinistas can overthrow the government or win the next election. That threat coupled with existing hostile feelings between the nation states make Nicaragua a potential threat. Nicaragua's vital interests are: 1.) survival of Nicaragua as an independent nation free of influence from the United States; 2.) stimulate an economic recovery with free access to markets and hard currency; and 3.) improved relations with the Central American governments.⁷³ A comparison of vital interests is shown in Figure 31.

Nicaragua is not a likely threat to the vital interests of the United States. The vital interests matrix reflects the change in the relationship since the Chamorro Government came to power. However, Nicaragua is continually subject to a catalyst changing the government and resulting in a radical swings in stated vital interests. The forecasting system needs continuous updates on the situation in Nicaragua.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX - NICARAGUA

| Nicaragua United States | Survival of Nicaragua | Economic Recovery | Improved Relations with Central America |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | <i>Shared</i> | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Stable world | neutral | neutral | neutral |

Figure 31

Three non-nation states have repeatedly been cited in the review of potential threats by Unified Command: the Drug Cartels, Religious Strife, and Mass Migration. These non-nation state entities defy country and regional boundaries. They are an increasing force in the geopolitical considerations, posing a significant threat, and requiring extraordinary efforts of national power to address.

The world drug cartels conduct activities, in some degree, in all nation states. However, certain nation states can be cited as having key production centers or serve as the headquarters for cartel operations. Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Panama in SOUTHCOM. Burma and Thailand in PACOM, and Pakistan in CENTCOM are clear examples. These nation states are not the potential threats, the drug cartel operating within their borders are. The drug cartels are considered a threat because of intent and capabilities. The drug cartel's vital interests are: 1) free flow of illegal drugs; 2.) protection of drug growing and processing centers; 3.) unlimited

access to drug markets; and 4.) isolate local governments from the United States drug enforcement efforts.⁷⁴ The vital interests matrix in Figure 32 shows the comparison.

It is obvious that the drug cartels represent a likely threat to the United States. Currently, the United States is expending resources to combat drug cartel operations. The cartels, backed by extensive resources, will be a long term threat to the vital interests of the United States. The difficulty is that it is not only a regional problem but a global problem. Each Unified Command has partial responsibility and that gets to the core of the problem identifying who is in charge. It will take interagency and international corporation to address the situation.

VITAL INTERESTS MATRIX - DRUG CARTEL

| United States \ Drug Cartel | Flow of Drugs | Protection of growing centers | Protection of Drug Markets | Isolation of United States |
|-------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | neutral | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |
| Stable world | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |

Figure 32

The on-going civil-religious-racial war in the Balkans and southern tier of the former Soviet Union poses a potential threat. The dynamic at work is intra-regional religious strife and it impacts EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. The real threat is the polarization of religious and racial factions stirred by the ongoing situation. The conflict involves not only the vital interests of those involved but their survival interests. It has become a test of wills. While Bosnia-Herzegovina may be the current media focus, religious tensions are spreading to the southern republics of the former Soviet Union, Turkey, Sudan, the Middle East, and India. This non-nation state threat involves racial and religious allegiances that cross international boundaries. The vital interests are: 1.) survival of religious beliefs; 2.) protection of religious and racial members in all nation states; 3.) establishment of religious and racial enclaves; and 4) promotion of religion.⁷⁵ A comparison of the vital interests must consider not only the nation state but the impact on the region (Figure 33).

This non-nation state and the United States have major vital interests in conflict. Dealing with the racial-religious undertones will require the use of all elements of national power. The most dangerous threat is the regional spread conflicts with nation states aligning against

each other by race or religion. The Balkan's and the on-going strife in the former republics of the Soviet Union are potentially the beginning of a deeper more difficult confrontation. The threat of interracial/inter-religious wars is a likely threat for the foreseeable future.

VITAL INTERESTS MATRIX - RELIGIOUS STRIFE

| Religious Strife United States | Racial & Religious Integrity | Protection of Religious members | Establish Religious Enclaves | Promotion of Religion |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Survival of U.S. | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | neutral |
| Stable world | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |

Figure 33

There is ongoing mass migration of people rivaled only by the movement of refugees after World War II. Most of this migration is from North Africa and Eastern Europe toward the economically strong West. This migration is a major concern of all Western European nations.⁷⁶ Large numbers of people are moving or are attempting to migrate escaping war, economic hardship, or religious or racial persecution. Estimates of the numbers range in the millions over the next five years.⁷⁷ Major sources of refugees are North Africans seeking economic opportunity and Eastern Europeans seeking both economic opportunity and safety. Socialized Western Europe sees the integration of these peoples as an additional drain on already too fragile economies. Steep rises in crime and racial and religious tension within their countries are attributed by many to the influx of refugees. This migration presents a potential threat stimulating internal hostile orientation between groups and is a catalyst destabilizing critical European allies.

The vital interests of this entity are in fact the needs or interests of individuals magnified many times. They are: 1.) personal and family safety; 2.) economic opportunity and security; 3.) religious freedom; and 4.) racial harmony.⁷⁸ A comparison of these vital interests against those of the United States is shown in Figure 34.

There are no vital interests of the United States that conflict with this non-nation state. The United States has successfully integrated a number of mass migrations and its sensitivity is skewed by that experience. Integrating various nationalities and religions is an accepted part of the United States and its heritage. As a nation, it is hard to understand the Western European attitudes in the matter. Yet, it is having an adverse impact on critical allies⁷⁹. It is focusing

internal and external basic orientation and is destabilizing governments that United States has extensive economic and political relations. Mass migration is a likely threat and will continue destabilize Western Europe for at least the next five years.

VITAL INTERESTS MATRIX - MASS MIGRATION

| Mass Migration United States | Personal Safety | Economic Opportunity | Religious Freedom | Racial Harmony |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Survival of U.S. | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> |
| Healthy Economy | neutral | <i>shared</i> | neutral | neutral |
| Healthy relations with allies | neutral | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Stable world | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> |

Figure 34

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations

At the outset, this effort identified a new paradigm influencing the United States. The monolithic threat and bipolar world that had existed for sixty years disappeared in a rapid succession of events. The United States finds itself in a very different and dynamic environment. Its traditional means of identifying threats as those nation states aligned with the Soviet Block is antiquated. This paper suggests a forecasting system that structures a thought process to identify threats in any environment. That process was described and put to a hypothetical and historical case study review. The reviews showed that it had application and might assist in reducing the ambiguity inherent in the current global environment.

The forecasting system was applied to that situation. It identified twenty nation states and non-nation states as potential threats to the vital interests of the United States. Each of these potential threats received additional research identifying their vital interests. The vital interests were compared with those of the United States in separate vital interests matrices. That comparison provided a refined list of twelve nation states and three non-nation states as likely threats to the United States now and in the future (Figure 35).

The process reduced a large population (214 entities) to fifteen entities that could require the United States to use an element or elements of its national power to protect its vital interests. The intent of the process is to give decision makers and their planning staffs sufficient lead time

to prepare options and coordinate the use of power. The United States with its resources and capabilities should never be placed in a threat situation where its first and only option is to use military force.

| | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| EUCOM | CENTCOM | PACOM |
| Russia | Iran | China |
| Religious Strife* | Iraq | North Korea |
| Libya | Syria | Japan |
| South Africa | Religious Strife* | Vietnam |
| Mass Migration* | | India |
| LANTCOM | SOUTHCOM | Drug Cartel* |
| Cuba | Drug Cartel* | Religious Strife* |
| Drug Cartel* | | |
| *non-nation state | | |

Figure 35

The forecasting system is not easy to use. It requires continuous and detailed analysis and collection. Several unstable nation states require daily monitoring to determine their status. Hence, the process does not provide a simple solution; but like all forecasting systems it improves as more information and study are assimilated.

The forecast provided above drives the following recommendations:

1.) **Develop a grand strategy.** The diversity of the threats requires the United States to develop a new grand strategy consisting of thoughtfully integrated diplomatic, economic, and military initiatives. Grand strategy preparation in the old East-West confrontational environment was focused on the containment of the Soviet Union. Economic, diplomatic, and military efforts were easily coordinated by a single priority: successfully compete with the Soviet Union and its allies. That dialectic changed with the demise of the Soviet Union and in the vacuum of world order that has followed. The threats articulated by the forecast are indicative of an ambiguous and chaotic environment. The environment is characterized by a growing number of regional powers exerting influence and seeking boarder international roles. There is also a growing diversity of threats. The Soviet's posed primarily a military threat that the United States matched. The forecast identifies economic, diplomatic, as well as military threats making preparation and execution of a new grand strategy an imperative. A grand strategy in this environment must respond to a variety of challenges from militant and aggressive Iran's, Iraq's, and North Korea's to economically competitive Japan.

Economic coalitions and emerging superpowers of Europe and Japan challenge the United States for leadership and impact negatively on its vital interests. External and internal

economic strategies are needed to allow the United States the agility to compete with these economic threats.

Diplomatic strategies require a clear enunciation of vital interests of the United States and its position on a range of issues from global environment, to genocide, and to weapons proliferation. Diplomatic initiatives must reduce proliferation of sophisticated conventional arms and the dangerous weapons of mass destruction. Rapid resolution of regional conflicts founded on ethnic hatred and animosities must be accomplished or face boarder confrontations in the Balkans, the southern tier of the former Soviet Union, and the subcontinent of India.

Military strategies must address an ever boarding spectrum of conflict (Figure 36). Expanded missions will take place in a period of reduced resources. The military strategy of the United States must first deter and then if necessary defeat a wide diversity of military threats.




Figure 36

To be effective each of these specific strategies must be integrated into the new grand strategy. The environment predicted by the forecast makes this more difficult with an exponential increase in problems and conflicting priorities. Success for United State's policies and efforts in this environment will be difficult with a grand strategy but impossible without one.

2.) **Address non-nation state threats and challenges.** The forecast identified three non-nation state threats. These threats cross traditional nation state boundaries. They have ability to unite the masses and ignite large scale conflict. Their explosive nature requires their integration and constant consideration into grand and regional strategies. To meet the non-nation state challenge will require a variety of coalitions and alliances. For example to address the

threat of the Drug Cartel requires a coalition of most of the South and Central American nation states, international agencies, and the United Nations. Non-nation state threats cannot be addressed by the efforts of a single nation state.

3.) **Develop a regional perspectives and strategies.** As the world moves to an increasing multipolar environment, nation states cannot be dealt with on a case by case basis. Nation states will be bound together by military alliances, cultural ties, and economic cooperation to increase their power and influence. Separate regional strategies are needed as a subset of the grand strategy to address this phenomena. This will require that various governmental agencies adopt regional perspectives and infrastructures to meet the demands of a multipolar world. The first requirement of these infrastructures is to constantly coordinate ensuring coherent and consistent policies for each region.

4.) **Develop a balanced military force.** The likely threats pose a range of military challenges from nuclear confrontation to guerrilla activity. This requires military forces of the United States to have a balance of capabilities to deal with the boarder spectrum of conflict represented in Figure 41. Heavy sealift, a rapidly deployable mix of heavy and light forces, immediate force projection, and humanitarian relief assets are capabilities needed to meet likely threats identified in the forecast.

On the high end of the spectrum are Strategic deterrence and defense. This requirement speaks to a continuing need for a credible Space-Based Defense Initiative. This would provide enough deterrence against the likely threat of a limited strike, an accident, or the action of international terrorists. The break up of the Soviet Union and the uncertain status of strategic theater, and tactical nuclear weapons makes it wise to continue research and move to a limited capability of protecting key areas of the United States. The thinking in this area needs to include a military response to chemical and biological attacks against the United States and its allies. These weapons are just as lethal, but the United States has no stated response. Diplomatic efforts bring the real security and stability, by eliminating nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Forward presence will mean limited forces abroad. A smaller force stationed overseas assumes greater risk in any contingency requiring significant forces. Expanded strategic lift capabilities are necessary if this strategy is to work and CONUS based forces must be rapidly projected so that risk does not become folly. The improvised strategic lift used in DESERT SHIELD will suffice for near term, but a capability must be developed. A KL-7 fast transport or the C-17 aircraft program maturing after the turn of the century is not a wise use of resources nor conducive to success of this strategy.

These deployable force packages will serve to make a joint force. No future military action will be single service. Deployment and training strategies need to focus on joint operations

and campaign planning based on likely contingencies. Those likely contingencies are taken from a likely set of threats developed by the forecast. To test the viability of various strategies, campaign plans must be wargamed against the likely set of threats. This is the only means to validate the myriad problems associated with a CONUS based force package responding to a crisis.

Crisis response has taken on added dimensions in the new environment. Military forces may be required to support earthquake victims in California, fight forest fires in Oregon, provide riot control in Detroit, Los Angeles, or Washington D.C., or wage a mid-intensity coalition conflict half way around the world. This reality coupled with the forecast drives a force structure based on capabilities. The total force (regulars, reserves, and national guard) must be of a higher quality, pliable enough to engage in disaster relief one month and in coalition operations the next. The possibility of sequential missions across the spectrum will require the United States to reconstitute and continually redeploy joint force packages.

Thus, military planners must look beyond the current mission. They must anticipate missions and the forecasting system could facilitate their planning efforts. Agility and flexibility must permeate every level. Force packages must be able to recover and reconstitute quickly and meet the needs of the next mission. A smaller force will continually move in a cycle of planning, deployment, operations, and reconstitution. The military strategist's job is harder with increased demands and fewer resources.

The focus of this effort was to determine likely threats to the United States using a forecasting system. The process has produced a set of likely threats. The forecast may confirm existing perceptions. The value of the forecast should not be judged a success because it conforms to what many perceive. It should be evaluated as a process that logically reviews the environment and articulates likely threats regardless of institutional or individual predisposition. Its integration into threat assessments will enhance planning and execution at the strategic and operational levels.

ENDNOTES

¹ November 9, 1989, the fall of Berlin Wall symbolizing a changed Europe and demise of the Warsaw Pact. February 28, 1991, the end of the Gulf ground war, confirming the United States as the world's only superpower. December 25, 1991, the formal end of the nation state called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the demise bipolar world that had existed since the end of the Second World War.

² The significant changes experience in the last three years mark and end of a period. The new period is ill defined and the United States, its partners, and competitors are struggling to determine the trends and workable strategies in the new environment.

³ Lider, Julian, Correlation of Forces: An Analysis of Marxist-Lenin Concepts, New York, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986, p.20.

⁴ There are numerous recent examples including failures to forecast changes in China, Cuba, and break-up of the former Soviet Union.

⁵ The Soviet Battlefield Development Plan was produced by the Army Intelligence Agency. It is a multiple volume effort addressing all elements of the Soviet Military.

⁶ Grand strategy coordinates subordinate economic, diplomatic, and military strategies. Threat forecasting must focus on not only military threats, but economic and diplomatic threats. Anticipating threats or forecasting of threats allows policy makers a reasoned view into the future.

⁷ Nuechterlein, Donald E., United States National Interests in a Changing World, Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1973, p. 11.

⁸ Nuechterlein, Donald E., America Recommitted, Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1991, p. 28.

⁹ Chuyev, Yu. V. and Mikhaylov, Yu. B., Forecasting in Military Affairs, A Soviet View, Moscow USSR: Published under the auspices of the United States Air Force, 1975, p. 8.

¹⁰ Chuyev and Mikhaylov, p.8.

¹¹ Chuyev and Mikhaylov, p.8.

¹² Nuechterlein, Donald E., America Recommitted, Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1991, pp 18-19. The vital interest matrix is an evolution of the national interest matrix described by Nuechterlein. The idea for this means of comparison was made by Dr. James Schneider, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

¹³ Howard, Michael and Paret Peter, On War, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 76.

¹⁴ Spanier, John, Games Nations Play, Washington D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993, p 10.

¹⁵ Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter, On War, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 76.

¹⁶ Barnett, Correlli, The Collapse of British Power, Atlantic Heights New Jersey Humanities Press, 1972, p. xi

¹⁷Spanier, John, Games Nations Play, Washington D.C., Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993, pp. 119-120.

¹⁸Morris, William, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, New York, New York: American Heritage Publishing Company, 1969, p.211.

¹⁹Rostow, Walt W., The Stages of Economic Growth, New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960, p. 38.

²⁰Hazen, Charles D., Europe Since 1815, New York, New York: Holt Henry and Company, 1910, p.29.

²¹Hazen. p.7.

²²There were many more nation states in 1816 than those listed in Figure 9. These states were selected to illustrate the process. Additionally, these states play key roles in the issues of the 19th Century and the case study.

²³Hazen, Charles D., Europe Since 1815, New York, New York: Holt Henry and Company, 1910, p.17.

²⁴Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York, New York: Random House Publishers, 1987, p.151.; and Hazen, Charles D., Europe Since 1815, New York, New York: Holt Henry and Company, 1910, pp. 17 and 518-519.

²⁵Keegan, John, The Price of Admiralty, New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1988, p. 8.

²⁶Hazen, Charles D., Europe Since 1815, New York, New York: Holt Henry and Company, 1910, p. 23 and pp. 27-38.

²⁷Hazen. pp. 147-149.

²⁸Hazen. p.105.

²⁹It is of interest that Belgium neutrality would be the catalyst that would bring Britain and Germany into conflict at the beginning of World War I.

³⁰Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York, New York: Random House Publishers, 1987, pp. 187-188.

³¹Eyck, Erich, Bismarck and the German Empire, London, England: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1950, pp. 189-190 and 194.

³²The United States potentially enjoys the same circumstance of secure geopolitical position and protected by unquestioned military power.

³³Mansergh, Nicholas, The Coming of the First World War - A Study in the European Balance 1878-1914, New York, New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1949, p.

³⁴Eyck, Erich, Bismarck and the German Empire, London, England: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1950, pp. 194, 223-228, and 253

³⁵Hazen, Charles D., Europe Since 1815, New York, New York: Holt Henry and Company, 1910. p.287.

³⁶Eyck, Erich, Bismarck and the German Empire, London, England: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1950, pp.187-188.

³⁷In fact Wilhelm II followed his father who ruled for only ninety-eight days before passing away

³⁸Allen, George H., The Great War, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, George Barrie's Sons, 1915. p.80.

³⁹Allen. p. 87.

⁴⁰Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York, New York: Random House Publishers, 1987, p.211.

⁴¹Allen, George H., The Great War, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, George Barrie's Sons, 1915. p.89.

⁴²Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York, New York: Random House Publishers, 1987. p

⁴³Allen, George H., The Great War, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, George Barrie's Sons, 1915. p.90.

⁴⁴Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York, New York: Random House Publishers, 1987, p.195.

⁴⁵The United States can expect challenges to its superpower status. Those challenges will grow as intent to compete and evolve capabilities.

⁴⁶Allen, George H., The Great War, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, George Barrie's Sons, 1915. p.140.

⁴⁷Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York, New York: Random House Publishers, 1987, pp. 209-215.

⁴⁸This multipolar condition drives nation states to form coalition or alliances to protect or promote shared vital interests.

⁴⁹The dynamic of change can impact threat appreciation in a variety of ways. In the case study, change was slow and the nuances of a developing threat were not easily understood or recognized. In today's environment the pace of change is exceeding rapid. The indicators of a threat develop more quickly than they can be assimilated and studied.

⁵⁰ New York Times Atlas, New York, New York: First Time Books, 1992. The number 209 considers the former republics of the Soviet Union as separate nation states. Additionally, the separate new nation states of the former Yugoslavia are included as entities. Lastly, the Czech and Slovakian Republic created on 1 January, 1993 are part of the total. The non-nation states were not included.

⁵¹The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office. 1991

- 52**Diller, Daniel C., Russia and the Independent States. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1992. pp.188-189 and 197-198.
- 53**To understand the convoluted dynamics facing forecasting system, review the catalyst events in Russia during mid-March and early April 1993.
- 54**Diller, Daniel C., Russia and the Independent States. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1992. pp.146-148 and 292-294.
- 55**Diller. pp. 275-278.
- 56**Diller. pp. 251-255.
- 57**Diller, Daniel C., The Middle East. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1991. p.197.
- 58**South Africa - Country Profile 1991-1992." Business International. 1991, pp.3-19.
- 59**Diller, Daniel C., The Middle East. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1991. p.149.
- 60**Diller. p.162.
- 61**Diller. p.223.
- 62**Part of the opening statement of CIA Director Woolsey to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 23 February 1992.
- 63**Pakistan, Afkanistan - Country Report No11992." Business International. 1992. p.7.
- 64**Change, King-yuh, Perspectives on Development of Mainland China. Boulder. Colorado: Westview Press, 1985. p.123.
- 65**Chang. p.169.
- 66**Chang. p.391.
- 67**"India, Nepal - Country Profile No. 4 1991." Business International. 1991, pp.11-14.
- 68**An, Tai Sung, North Korea - A Political Handbook. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1983, pp.80-84.
- 69**"Vietnam - Country Profile 1991-92." Business International. 1991-92, pp. 11-13.
- 70**Thurow, Lester, Head to Head. New York, New York: William Morrow and Company. Inc., 1992, p.145.
- 71**Thurow. pp.145-148.
- 72**Dominguez, Jorge, I. and Hernandez, Rafael, U. S.-Cuban Relations in the 1990s. Boulder. Colorado. Westview Press. 1989. pp.16-20 and 37-39.
- 73**Nicaragua. Costa Rica. Panama - Country Report." Business International. 1992. pp 10-14.

74The Drug Cartels have not announced their vital interests. The vital interests were gleaned from briefings and discussions during AOSF trip to SOUTHCOM 15 -24 November

75There are no stated vital interests for religious organizations. The focus of the vital interests in this section reflect the differences of Islam and Christianity.

76During to the Advance Operational Studies Fellow's tour of Europe the issue of Mass Migration was an element of briefings provided at NATO, SHAPE, AFCENT, and in Switzerland. The Western Europeans expressed a growing concern over the issue and its current and future impact on the region.

77Figures provided in an unclassified command briefing at AFSOUTH Headquarters, 10 March 1993.

78There are no stated vital interests for non-nation state of mass migration. These interests were derived from briefings presented at NATO, AFSOUTH, and in Switzerland during the Advance Operational Studies Fellowship trip to Europe, March 1993.

79The United States tolerance increased migrations maybe waning as witness by the passed and current administrations stance on Haiti.

Annex A - Hypothetical Case Study for Nation State A

To examine the standards and logic of the forecast system a hypothetical nation state will be used. Nation State A has a variety of relations with other nation states. It carefully uses its resources and elements of national power. It has adopted, as part of its grand strategy, a threat forecast system. Using the filter process Nation State A's policy and decision makers evaluate eight nation states.

Nation State One is a country with no basic instinct, intent, or capabilities to threaten the vital interests of Nation State A, nor is it in danger of major changes from a catalyst. This nation state is a non threat possessing no current or potential threat to Nation State A. Many nation states fall into this category; an example is the relationship that exists between Germany and St. Lucia.

Nation State Two has a long term hatred, historical conflict, and shares a disputed boundary with Nation State A. There is no indication of hostile intent nor of developing capabilities. Lastly, the current government is stable and no immediate alliances or revolutionary movements threaten its rule. This country is not considered a potential threat lacking hostile intent and capabilities to threaten Nation State A's vital interests. Nation states having aggressive basic orientation can evolve intent and capabilities. Revisiting these nation states and reevaluating them is part of responsibility intelligence infrastructure of Nation State A. An example of this interaction is long term border dispute between El Salvador and Honduras.

Nation State Three has capabilities to threaten Nation State A. There is no basic orientation nor hostile intent. Nation State Three is stable and no alliance or change in government will disturb stability. These nation states tend to be allies and have strong cultural and/or social bonds with Nation State A. While this nation state has a capability to threaten Nation State A it was screened having no indication of hostile intent and a stable long term relationship. Great Britain and France share this type of relationship.

Nation State Four has a hostile basic instincts directed at Nation State A. Beyond the emotion, it has taken steps to compete (hostile intent) with Nation State A and threatens its vital interests. This nation state passes the screen and becomes a potential threat to Nation State A. While lacking a capability it has intent and will likely develop a capability. This nation state bears careful scrutiny by Nation State A. An example of this type of relationship is the tension between India and Pakistan.

Nation State Five has hostile intent and capabilities negatively affecting the vital interests of Nation State A. This nation state passes the filter and becomes potential threat. Nation State Five stimulates two factors normally alerting policy makers to potential problems intent coupled with capabilities. North and South Korea share this type of relationship.

Nation State Six has hostile intent but little capability to impact on the vital interests of Nation State A. It shares some cultural and social ties with Nation State A. Nation State Six is a developed economic power aggressively competing with Nation State A. It has little military capability to impact Nation State A's other vital interests but a strong technology base assures future military capabilities. This nation state is a potential threat. The filter normally uses two criteria to define a potential threat. Intent implies that a nation will develop capability. That potential results in the determination. Citing examples for this case is difficult because there may be no outward manifestation in the early stages. An example may be economic tensions between Japan and Germany.

Nation State Seven is torn by civil war. Its capabilities are immature and no hostile intent is directed toward Nation State A. This nation state is not a potential threat to Nation State A. Recent examples are Venezuela, Somalia, and Ethiopia and their relationship Norway.

Nation State Eight has capabilities and can easily be swung by an alliance, revolution or other catalytic event. One potential impact of events is development of hostile intent directed at Nation State A. These nation states are potential threats because of their capabilities and instability. An example would be the relationship between Russia and the Baltic States.

Actions of non nation states impact on Nation State A's vital interests. An example is a drug cartel or non-nation state one. The drug cartel is assessed to have hostile orientation and capabilities. This non-nation state exists as a shadow identity within a nation state. The nation state is considered an ally with no long term basic instincts or hostile intent. Its capabilities are for self defense. Yet, it is the center of drug operation supporting an epidemic Nation State A. The actions by the cartel are against Nation State A's vital interests and it is a potential threat.

Potential Threats Matrix

| Nation State | Basic Orientation | Intent | Capabilities | Catalyst | Potential Threat |
|----------------------|-------------------|--------|--------------|----------|------------------|
| One | No | No | No | No | No |
| Two | Yes | No | No | No | No |
| Three | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Four | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Five | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Six | No | Yes | No | No | Yes |
| Seven | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Eight | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Non-Nation State One | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |

Figure 42

Using the results of the survey above and the potential threats matrix, Figure 42, Nation State A faces potential threats from Nation States Four, Five, Six, Eight, and one non-nation state. The filter pre-assessment, reduces the number of considerations to manageable level and allows Nation State A to focus its elements of national power on the most dangerous.

Supporting the analysis is a mathematical concept (see variables). There are several expressions quantifying the analysis in Annex A and the matrix. A simplified expression is the sum of all nation states minus the sum of all non-threat nation states equals potential threat nation states or $\sum N - \sum NT = P$. This equation separates Nation States One, Two, Three, and Seven from those who are potential threats. Each potential threat can be expressed as an equation. Nation State Four can be expressed as $B+I = P$. Nation States Five, Six, and non nation state one are expressed as $I+C = P$ and that of Nation State Eight is expressed as $C+CI = P$.

The expressions are based on clearly definable examples. Relationships between nation states are not as well defined. Relying on a simple quantitative approach is dangerous. All nation states with hostile basic orientation do not develop into potential threats. Meeting mathematical parameters of an expression is not a forecast system. Quantitative analysis supplements qualitative analysis but is never the determining factor in a forecast system. Having articulated the potential threats using the filter process, the vital interests matrix will refine the list to a set of nation states that are likely threats.

Nation State A has the following vital interests: 1.) free access to lines of communication; 2.) open economic markets; 3.) freely elected governments; and 4.) stable multipolar world. A review of each of the potential threat's vital interests begins with Nation State Four.

Nation State Four was considered a potential threat because it had hostile intent and basic orientation, but little capability. Its vital interest are: 1.) promotion of a fundamentalist religious sect in its area of interest; 2.) control of local geopolitical choke points; 3.) development of improved force projection capabilities and; 4.) control of regional vital resources.

Nation State Four is in conflict with the vital interests of Nation State A (Figure 43). The issue of lines of communications (LOCs) and access to resources will be a source of confrontation. Nation State A's concern for freely elected governments will be seen by Nation State Four as a threat to its survival interests. Nation State Four has intent and conflicting vital interests making it a likely threat to Nation State A now and in the future.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX

| Nation State Four Nation State A | Religious Sect | Control of LOCs | Force Projection | Control of Resources |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| LOCs | neutral | in conflict | in conflict | neutral |
| Open Markets | in conflict | in conflict | neutral | in conflict |
| Free Govt's | in conflict | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Stable World | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |

Figure 43

Nation State Five was identified as a potential threat demonstrating hostile intent and capabilities to threaten Nation State A. Nation State Five has the following vital interests: 1.) preservation of the totalitarian state; 2.) promotion of the totalitarian government to other nation states; and 3.) control of vital sea lines of communications (see Figure 44).

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX

| Nation State Four Nation State A | Religious Sect | Control of LOCs | Force Projection | Control of Resources |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|----------------------|
| LOCs | neutral | in conflict | in conflict | neutral |
| Open Markets | in conflict | in conflict | neutral | in conflict |
| Free Govt's | in conflict | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Stable World | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |

Figure 44

The conflicting vital interests of these nation states make them rivals. Nation State Five is perceived as an immediate threat to Nation State A's vital interests, combining hostile intent with capabilities. Competing and conflicting vital interests are considered survival interests in both nation states. Nation State Five is Nation State A's most visible and likely threat. Considerable resources have been committed to maintain a balance of power with Nation State Five. Nation State A must take precautions not to overlook other threats while dealing with the

larger and more visible threat of Nation State Five.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX

| Nation State Five Nation State A | Totalitarian State | Promotion of State | Control of SLOCs |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| LOCs | neutral | neutral | in conflict |
| Open Markets | neutral | neutral | in conflict |
| Free Gov't's | in conflict | in conflict | neutral |
| Stable World | in conflict | in conflict | in conflict |

Figure 45

Nation State Six has hostile intent challenging Nation state A's economic well-being. Other elements of national power are not as developed, but with a strong economy, military and diplomatic initiatives are expected. Nation State Six's vital interest are: 1.) protection of national markets while exploiting overseas markets; 2.) establishment of economic cartel with itself as the leader; 3.) free access to lines of communications; and 4.) a stable world with it being a economic superpower (Figure 46).

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX

| Nation State Six Nation State A | National Markets | Economic Cartel | LOCs | Stable World |
|------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|
| LOCs | <i>shared</i> | neutral | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> |
| Open Markets | in conflict | in conflict | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> |
| Free Gov't's | neutral | neutral | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> |
| Stable World | neutral | neutral | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> |

Figure 46

Nation State Six's hostile economic intent is reflected in competing vital interests with Nation State A. Unlike Nation State Five, Nation State A shares some vital interests with Nation State Six. Nation State Six's relationship is cordial and they are allies protecting shared vital interests. However, the hostile intent is clear and Nation State A considers Nation State Six a likely threat. The debate in Nation State A will center on how best to use its elements of national power to compete with Nation State Six.

Nation State Eight was assessed with capabilities but no hostile intent. There is national economic strife and the possibility exists for a peaceful transition of leadership. Nation State Eight's vital interests are: 1.) free access to lines of communication; 2.) stable world governments; and 3.) open markets.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX

| Nation State Eight Nation State A | LOCs | Stable World | Open Markets |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| LOCs | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> |
| Open Markets | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> |
| Free Gov't's | <i>neutral</i> | <i>shared</i> | <i>neutral</i> |
| Stable World | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> | <i>shared</i> |

Figure 47

Nation State Eight shares a number of vital interests with Nation State A (Figure 47). They are strong allies sharing cultural and social ties. Nation State Eight is not a likely threat. The threat of a negative catalyst event concerns Nation State A and periodic reviews will determine if the catalyst has caused a radical shift in vital interests.

Nation State A is concerned about the raising trend of non-nation states and the impact they have on stability. A small nation state has a powerful drug cartel operating within its sovereign territory. This non-nation state has hostile intent and capabilities to negatively impact Nation State A. The non-nation state has the following vital interests: 1.) free flow of illegal drugs; 2.) protection of drug growing and processing centers; and 3.) access to and availability of markets.

Nation State A and the non-nation state have divergent vital interests sharing little in common (Figure 48). The very nature of the non-nation state's focus places the vital interest and perhaps the survival interests of Nation State A at risk. It is a likely threat to Nation State A. The traditional relationships and uses of national power may not apply to the non-nation state. Nation State A will have to determine a different strategy to meet the threat of the non-nation state.

Having completed the vital interest comparisons Nation State A has four likely threats serving to focus its strategy and uses of national power. One threat is in its infancy (Nation State Four) and will develop overtime. Nation State Five is an immediate threat competing with all elements of its national power. Nation State Six is an economic competitor, with hostile intent, and an ability to develop other elements of national power. It is a current and future threat but also an ally. The non-nation state threatens the fabric bonding Nation State A and is a likely

threat now and in the future. Nation State A leverages this forecast to prepare a grand strategy protecting its vital interests through negotiation, alliances, economic restructuring, or if necessary early preparation for armed conflict.

VITAL INTEREST MATRIX

| Non Nation State A \ State One | Flow of Drugs | Protection of drug centers | Open Markets |
|--------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| LOCs | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Open Markets | neutral | neutral | neutral |
| Free Gov't's | In conflict | In conflict | In conflict |
| Stable World | In conflict | In conflict | In conflict |

Figure 48

As with the potential threats, likely threats can be mathematically expressed as the sum of potential threat states having conflicting vital interests or $T = \sum (P + V)$. Again the analysis cannot be defined in simple math logic. The determination of conflicting vital interests requires a heuristic approach. The expression allows quantitative analysis after the qualitative analysis has been completed.

Annex B Threat Matrix

| Nation State | Basic Instinct | Hostile Intent | Capabilities | Catalyst | Threat (Yes/No) |
|--------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|----------|-----------------|
| Afghanistan | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Albania | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Algeria | No | No | No | No | No |
| Angola | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Anguilla | No | No | No | No | No |
| Antigua | No | No | No | No | No |
| Argentina | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Australia | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Austria | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Bahamas | No | No | No | No | No |
| Bahrain | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Barbados | No | No | No | No | No |
| Belgium | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Belize | No | No | No | No | No |
| Benin | No | No | No | No | No |
| Bermuda | No | No | No | No | No |
| Bhutan | No | No | No | No | No |
| Bolivia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Bosnia Herzegovina | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Botswana | No | No | No | No | No |
| Brazil | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Brunei | No | No | No | No | No |
| Bulgaria | No | No | No | No | No |
| Burkina Faso | No | No | No | No | No |
| Burma | No | No | No | No | No |
| Burundi | No | No | No | No | No |
| Cambodia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Cameroon | No | No | No | No | No |
| Canada | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Cape Verde | No | No | No | No | No |

Annex B Threat Matrix

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Cayman Island | No | No | No | No | No |
| Central Africa Republic | No | No | No | No | No |
| Chad | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Chile | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| China | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Colombia | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Commonwealth of Independent States | | | | | |
| Russia | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Ukraine | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Byelorussia | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Armenia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Azerbaijan | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Moldavia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Central Asia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Kazakhstan | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Kirghizia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Tajikistan | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Turkmenistan | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Uzbekistan | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Georgia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Comororos | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Congo | No | No | No | No | No |
| Costa Rica | No | No | No | No | No |
| Cote D'Ivoire | No | No | No | No | No |
| Croatia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Cuba | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Cyprus | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Czech | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Denmark | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Djibouti | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Dominica | No | No | No | No | No |

Annex B Threat Matrix

| | | | | | |
|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Ecuador | No | No | No | No | No |
| Egypt | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| El Salvador | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Equatorial Guinea | No | No | No | No | No |
| Estonia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Ethiopia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Falkland Island | No | No | No | No | No |
| Fiji | No | No | No | No | No |
| Finland | No | No | No | No | No |
| France | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Gabon | No | No | No | No | No |
| Gambia | No | No | No | No | No |
| Germany | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Ghana | No | No | No | No | No |
| Gibraltar | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Greece | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Grenada | No | No | No | No | No |
| Guatemala | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Guinea | No | No | No | No | No |
| Guinea Bissau | No | No | No | No | No |
| Guyana | No | No | No | No | No |
| Haiti | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Honduras | No | No | No | No | No |
| Hong Kong | No | No | No | No | No |
| Hungary | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Iceland | No | No | No | No | No |
| India | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Indonesia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Iran | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Iraq | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Ireland | No | No | No | No | No |

Annex B Threat Matrix

| | | | | | |
|------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Israel | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |
| Italy | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Jamaica | No | No | No | No | No |
| Japan | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Jordan | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Kenya | No | No | No | No | No |
| Kiribati | No | No | No | No | No |
| Kosovo | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Kuwait | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Laos | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Laticva | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Lebanon | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Lesotho | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Liberia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Liechtenstein | No | No | No | No | No |
| Lithuania | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Luxembourg | No | No | No | No | No |
| Libya | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Macedonia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Madagascar | No | No | No | No | No |
| Malawi | No | No | no | No | No |
| Malaysia | No | No | No | No | No |
| Maldives | No | No | No | No | No |
| Mali | No | No | No | No | No |
| Malta | No | No | No | No | No |
| Marshall Islands | No | No | No | No | No |
| Mauritania | No | No | No | No | No |
| Mauritius | No | No | No | No | No |
| Mexico | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Micronesia | No | No | No | No | No |
| Monaco | No | No | No | No | No |

Annex B Threat Matrix

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Mongolia | No | No | No | No | No |
| Montenegro | No | No | No | No | No |
| Montserrat | No | No | No | No | No |
| Morocco | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Mozambique | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Namibia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Nauru | No | No | No | No | No |
| Nepal | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Netherlands | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |
| New Zealand | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Nicaragua | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Niger | No | No | No | No | No |
| Nigeria | No | No | No | No | No |
| North Korea | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Norway | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Oman | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Pakistan | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Panama | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Papua New Guinea | No | No | No | No | No |
| Paraguay | No | No | No | No | No |
| Peru | No | No | No | No | No |
| Philippines | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Pitcairn Islands | No | No | No | No | No |
| Poland | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Portugal | No | No | No | No | No |
| Qatar | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Romania | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Rwanda | No | No | No | No | No |
| St Helena | No | No | No | No | No |
| St Kitts and Nevis | No | No | No | No | No |
| St Lucia | No | No | No | No | No |

Annex B Threat Matrix

| | | | | | |
|--|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|
| St Vincent | No | No | No | No | No |
| San Marino | No | No | No | No | No |
| Sao Tome | No | No | No | No | No |
| Saudi Arabia | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Senegal | No | No | No | No | No |
| Serbia | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Seychelles | No | No | No | No | No |
| Sierra Leone | No | No | No | No | No |
| Singapore | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Slovenia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Slovakia | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Solomon Islands | No | No | No | No | No |
| Somalia | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| South Africa | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands | No | No | No | No | No |
| South Korea | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Spain | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Sri Lanka | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Sudan | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Suriname | No | No | No | No | No |
| Swaziland | No | No | No | No | No |
| Sweden | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Switzerland | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Syria | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Tanzania | No | No | No | No | No |
| Thailand | No | No | No | No | No |
| Togo | No | No | No | No | No |
| Tonga | No | No | No | No | No |
| Trinidad and Tobago | No | No | No | No | No |
| Tunisia | No | No | No | No | No |
| Turkey | No | No | No | Yes | No |

Annex B Threat Matrix

| | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Turks and Caicos Islands | No | No | No | No | No |
| Tuvalu | No | No | No | No | No |
| Uganda | No | No | No | No | No |
| United Arab Emirates | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| United Kingdom | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Uruguay | No | No | No | No | No |
| Vanuatu | No | No | No | No | No |
| Vatican City State | No | No | No | No | No |
| Venezuela | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Vietnam | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Virgin Islands | No | No | No | No | No |
| Vojvodina | No | No | No | No | No |
| Western Samoa | No | No | No | No | No |
| Yemen | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Zaire | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Zambia | No | No | No | No | No |
| Zimbabwe | No | No | No | No | No |
| Non-nation States | | | | | |
| Drug Cartels | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| International Business and Industry | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| International Banking | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Mass Migration | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Religious Strife | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

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